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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the understanding of how policy making shapes economic out-
comes, and the role of individual decision and incentives in this process. It consists of three
chapters, which focus on aspects of this general topic from an applied microeconomic per-
spective: (i) market mechanisms for environmental policy and their implications for ﬁrm
investment, (ii) political incentives of pork barrel environmental expenditures, and (iii)
strategic interaction in decision making among decentralized levels of government.
In the ﬁrst chapter, entitled Policy Uncertainty and Investment in Low-Carbon Technology,
which is joint work with Silvia Albrizio, we investigate how uncertainty over environmen-
tal policy aﬀects ﬁrms’ investment in low-carbon technology in the context of an emission
trading scheme. We develop a three period sequential model combining the industry and
electricity sectors and encompassing both irreversible and reversible investment possibil-
ities for ﬁrms. Additionally, we explicitly model policy uncertainty in the regulator’s
objective function as well as the market interactions giving rise to an endogenous permit
price. We ﬁnd that uncertainty reduces irreversible investment and that the availability
of both reversible and irreversible technologies partially eliminates the positive eﬀect of
policy uncertainty on reversible technology found in previous literature.
In the second chapter, entitled Pork Barrel as a Signaling Tool: The Case of US Envi-
ronmental Policy, I investigate whether signaling is a driving force of pre-electoral pork
barrel policies. I develop a two-period model of electoral competition where politicians use
current policies to signal their preferences to rational, forward-looking voters. There exists
an equilibrium where incumbents use pork barrel spending for signaling in majoritarian
systems. Results show that pork spending is directed towards ideologically homogeneous
groups and is mitigated if the incumbent is a “lame duck” or has a high discount rate.
The predictions of the model are tested using data on US State level environmental ex-
penditures. The results support the signaling motive as a central mechanism in generating
pork barrel towards the environment.
In the third chapter, entitled Interaction in Local Governments’ Spending Decisions: Ev-
idence from Portugal, which is joint with Linda Veiga and Miguel Portela, we analyze the
sources and the degree of interaction among Portuguese municipalities’ expenditure levels
by estimating a dynamic panel model, based on jurisdictional reaction functions. The
analysis is performed for all 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities from 1986 to 2006,
i
using alternative ways to measure neighborhood. Results indicate that local governments’
spending decisions are signiﬁcantly, and positively, inﬂuenced by the actions of neighboring
municipalities. Attempts to identify the sources of interaction allow us to conclude that
they are due to spillovers that require coordination in expenditure items and to mimicking
behavior possibly to attract households and ﬁrms.
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Preface
This thesis contributes to the understanding of how policy making shapes economic out-
comes, and the role of individual decision and incentives in this process. The thesis
consists of three chapters, which focus on diverse aspects of this general topic from an
applied microeconomic perspective: (i) market mechanisms for environmental policy and
their implications for ﬁrm investment (ii) political incentives of pork barrel environmental
expenditures, and (iii) strategic interaction in decision making among decentralized levels
of government. The ﬁrst focuses on issues relating to the current debate on the eﬃciency of
market-based environmental mechanisms. The question of how ﬁrms respond to environ-
mental policy in terms of investment has received considerable attention in recent years.
This is of particular interest given the proliferation of market-based instruments designed
to achieve a reduction of greenhouse gases, such as emission trading schemes. The follow-
ing two address public choice aspects of policy making. Public choice theory is concerned
with the application of economic principles to the study of political behavior. Contrary to
the assumption of a benevolent social planner, it studies the welfare decreasing economic
distortions caused by self-interested politicians and rent seeking groups. Assessing the
mechanisms responsible for this kind of behavior, and the incentives for both voters and
politicians to behave in this way is one of the goals of this thesis.
In the ﬁrst chapter, entitled Policy Uncertainty and Investment in Low-Carbon Technology,
which is joint work with Silvia Albrizio, we investigate how uncertainty over environmen-
tal policy aﬀects ﬁrms’ investment in low-carbon technology in the context of an emission
trading scheme. To this end, we develop a three period sequential model combining the
industry and electricity sectors, encompassing both irreversible and reversible investment
possibilities for ﬁrms. We model policy uncertainty in the regulator’s objective function
as well as the market interactions giving rise to an endogenous permit price. We then
calibrate the model with data for the United Kingdom, which takes part in the European
Union emission trading. We ﬁnd that, given a balanced proportion of the two regulated
sectors, the eﬀect of policy uncertainty depends on the nature of the investment and the
relative preferences of the government. First, uncertainty decreases aggregate irreversible
investment. Second, the eﬀect of uncertainty on reversible technology varies according to
the weight put by the regulating authority on the environment versus the economy. When
policy makers are strongly biased towards economic activity uncertainty might increase
v
investment in reversible technology, as it creates an option value for investing: ﬁrms use
the investment to hedge against price uncertainty in the permit market. However, this
positive eﬀect is weakened by interaction with the irreversible technology. Finally, con-
trary to previous literature, we ﬁnd that when policy makers are more environmentally
concerned, uncertainty reduces reversible investment. This suggests that in the case of the
European Union, where we observe a higher environmental awareness with clear long-run
green policy goals, the introduction of commitment mechanisms that reduce long-term
uncertainty might be beneﬁcial for investment. Conversely, when policy makers are con-
cerned primarily with economic expansion compared to environmental issues, as might
be the case for developing countries, a small level of uncertainty might create the right
incentives to increase reversible investment.
In the second chapter, entitled Pork Barrel as a Signaling Tool: The Case of US Environ-
mental Policy, I investigate whether signaling is a driving force of pre-electoral pork barrel
policies. This assignment of beneﬁts to particular groups at the expense of others consti-
tutes an eﬃciency loss when the budget is limited and ﬁxed. I develop a two-period model
of electoral competition where politicians use current policies to signal their preferences to
rational, forward-looking voters. I prove the existence of an equilibrium where incumbents
use pork barrel spending for signaling, and show that pork spending is directed towards
ideologically homogeneous groups and is mitigated if the incumbent is a “lame duck” or
has a high discount rate. The predictions of the model are then tested using data on
US State level environmental expenditures from 1970 to 2000. Environmental policy is
particularly prone to political pressure, as it triggers strong opinions from the electorate.
To measure pork barrel I focus on systematic increases in environmental expenditures in
election years relative to total expenditures, as well as deviations relative to the mean of all
the other years of the politician’s mandate. I create an indicator for voter environmental
preferences and ideological dispersion with survey data. The results support the signaling
motive as a central mechanism in generating pork barrel towards issues that elicit strong
preferences. This implies in particular that environmental policy issues are subject to
electoral cycle variations. Given that in order to be eﬃcient environmental policy requires
continued action across time, this has important implications for institutional design. For
example, mechanisms restraining the discretionary power of politicians that limit the size
of electorally driven cycles could increase the eﬃciency of environmental policy by shield-
ing it from electoral incentives.
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In the third chapter, entitled Interaction in Local Governments’ Spending Decisions: Ev-
idence from Portugal, which is joint with Linda Veiga and Miguel Portela, we analyze the
sources and the degree of interaction among Portuguese municipalities’ expenditure levels.
Municipalities might aﬀect each other’s spending decisions due to competition to attract
households, beneﬁt spillovers, or yardstick competition. Local interactions are a major
issue to understand the impact of budget decentralization policies. The institutional re-
forms that Portugal is implementing under the ﬁnancial assistance program agreed with
the IMF and the EU in May 2011 makes the topic even more relevant. In order to pro-
mote ﬁscal consolidation, it is important to gain new insights into public policy decisions
at the local level. We estimate a dynamic panel model, based on jurisdictional reaction
functions, where a municipality’s spending decisions are allowed to depend on those of
neighboring ones. We perform the analysis for all 278 Portuguese mainland municipal-
ities from 1986 to 2006 and construct alternative geographic, demographic and political
measures of neighborhood in order to account for possible sources of interdependence. We
furthermore account for the possibility of spatial correlation in addition to serial correla-
tion. Our results show that local governments do not make their spending decisions in
isolation; instead, they are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the actions of geographically neigh-
boring municipalities. We conclude that Portuguese municipalities react to each other’s
expenditures due to both spillovers that require coordination of public policies among geo-
graphically close municipalities and to mimicking behavior with the purpose of attracting
households and ﬁrms.
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Chapter 1
Policy Uncertainty and Investment
in Low-Carbon Technology
With Silvia Albrizio
1.1 Introduction
The question of how ﬁrms respond to environmental policy in terms of investment has
received considerable attention.1 This is of particular interest given the proliferation of
market-based instruments designed to achieve a reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG),
such as emission trading schemes. Currently, the biggest emission trading scheme (ETS )
is the European one, although in 2012 both California and Australia introduced respec-
tively the state GHG cap-and-trade programme, under the Global Warming Assembly
Act, and the carbon price mechanism, in the context of the Clean Energy Future plan.
An emission trading scheme is a cap-and-trade system designed to create incentives for
ﬁrms to invest in low-carbon technology, with the ﬁnal goal of reducing carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions. In practice, by allocating a certain amount of tradable emission permits
for each of the energy-intensive installations covered by the scheme, the ETS places a limit
on total CO2 emissions. This system creates a market for these permits so that, given
that ﬁrms have diﬀerent marginal costs of abatement, some installations ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to reduce their emissions and sell the unused allowances. This aggregate limit, or cap, and
consequently the allocation of permits per each installation, is set by a regulatory author-
ity periodically and at a decreasing rate. The periodicity of the cap decision allows the
policy makers to update the limit according to the realized technology innovation path,
to the actual investment process by ﬁrms and to possible government changes or priority
revisions due to business cycles. Although this system entails a ﬂexibility gain for the
authority, it also leads to uncertainty over the future cap and the future market price of
the allowances for the ﬁrms. As a consequence, given the long-term nature of investments
1See, for example, Zhao (2003) and Jung et al. (1996).
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in low-carbon technologies, the return on investment in abatement is also unknown at the
time of investing. Thus, how does uncertainty over the policy decisions, driven by the pe-
riodicity of the cap, aﬀect ﬁrms’ investment in low-carbon technologies? More speciﬁcally,
is the ETS eﬃcient when ﬁrms do not know future levels of the cap?
Previous literature has attempted to address similar questions. Blyth et al. (2007) study
how environmental policy uncertainty aﬀects power sector irreversible investment in low
carbon technology, following a real option approach. According to what the theory pre-
dicts,2 they ﬁnd that uncertainty over the price of permits, i.e., the process that drives
the future ﬂow of proﬁts, decreases irreversible investment. However this analysis presents
several limitations. First of all, policy uncertainty is represented as an exogenous shock
over the price of permits. This setting (an exogenous price and the absence of a policy
objective function) rules out any consideration of the feedback eﬀect from the ﬁrms to the
policy maker, which is important from a policy design perspective. Secondly, it concerns
only a portfolio choice: that is, the ﬁrms’ production is held ﬁxed, which eliminates a
potential instrument to deal with future uncertainty. Finally, it focuses only on one of the
sectors of the European scheme (EU ETS ), the power sector, and only one possible kind
of investment in low-carbon technology - the irreversible one.
We distinguish between two kinds of investment speciﬁc to the power sector: an irre-
versible one, which once made is used in production - such as renewable energy resources
or energy eﬃciency - and a reversible one, which may or may not be used in production
depending on ex post proﬁtability - as is the case of fuel switching.3
Diﬀerentiating between these two options is of vital importance for this research. In fact,
in the analysis by Chen and Tseng (2011), reversible investment is found to increase with
uncertainty. The investment studied takes the form of building up a gas plant, which
allows power companies to use gas for production when the price of coal (the input cost
plus the permit price) is higher than the gas price and vice-versa (fuel switching). This
investment provides electricity generators with a precautionary instrument that helps to
hedge the fuel price risk. However, the same criticisms made of Blyth et al. (2007) can be
directed at this contribution.
2See Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
3According to Shapiro and Varian (1999), a technology investment is comparable to an option when
switching costs are high and therefore a technology lock-in eﬀect comes into play. We extend this deﬁnition
to the case where switching costs are not extremely high but ﬁrms simply do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to switch
back to previous technology solution after having invested in new one.
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Finally, Colla et al. (2012) take a step further in modeling this market, by introducing
an objective function for the authority and endogenizing the price of the permits. They
study the optimal environmental policy for the EU ETS in the presence of speculators in
the market for allowances. However, in their setting, ﬁrms are homogeneous, with only
the choice of irreversible investment, and uncertainty regards future demand for the ﬁrms’
product, and not the policy rule.
As in previous literature, we consider the current set up of the EU ETS as representative
of a general scheme, although our results carry over to other cap-and-trade systems, such
as the newborn California programme.4 In fact, these two schemes share not only a com-
parable design of the cap, but also the type of sectors regulated.
We put forward a stylized but comprehensive setting where the two sectors regulated by
the EU ETS, industry and electricity, have access to diﬀerent low-carbon technologies.
Industries have access only to an irreversible clean technology: energy eﬃciency and re-
newable energy sources. Conversely, power companies may use both irreversible clean
technology and reversible technology, namely fuel switching: electricity generation ﬁrms
can construct a gas plant, while keeping the option of producing with existing coal plant.5
We explore the ﬁnal eﬀect of the interaction of these ﬁrms in the market in terms of ag-
gregate investment. For this purpose, we develop a three-period sequential model. In the
ﬁrst period, two ﬁrms, price takers in the market for emission permits and representative
of the two sectors, decide whether to invest in CO2 abating technologies; in the second
period, uncertainty over the relative preference of the authority over economic activity
versus environmental concerns is realized and the regulator chooses the aggregate cap.
Finally, ﬁrms decide on their production levels and fuel choices; and the permits market
clears.
To the best of our knowledge, no other model has put together both carbon-intensive
industries and electricity generators, which is essential to capture the ﬁnal behavior of the
aggregate level of investment - both reversible and irreversible - in low-carbon technology.
We also allow for output eﬀects in addition to substitution eﬀects, by allowing ﬁrms to
decide on production levels. Additionally, we clearly identify the uncertainty parameter
4Appendix 1.A provides a description of the EU ETS to the extent relevant for the purpose of this
analysis and explains the concept of policy uncertainty in this context. For further information regarding
the EU ETS see Ellerman et al. (2010) and Chevallier (2011).
5We exclude the reversible technology possibility for the industry sector as it is not a feasible option
for industrial production.
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in the regulator’s objective function as the relative weight the authority puts on environ-
mental concerns. This provides us with a feedback eﬀect, since the regulator internalizes
the eﬀect of her choices on ﬁrms’ fuel choices. Moreover, the political nature of uncer-
tainty allows us to derive important policy implications regarding commitment incentives
by policy makers. This is because this type of uncertainty can be directly inﬂuenced by
the authority, as opposed, for instance, to demand uncertainty. Finally, our formulation
allows us to derive a closed form solution and therefore to clearly identify the eﬀects of
the diﬀerent forces that play a role in this complex picture. Our model can thus be used
as a benchmark to further include additional features of interest of the diﬀerent ETS and
study how the outcome varies with them.
Our results show that, given a balanced proportion of the two regulated sectors, the eﬀect
of policy uncertainty depends on the nature of the investment and the relative preferences
of the government. First, as in the real options approach, uncertainty decreases aggregate
irreversible investment. Second, the eﬀect of uncertainty on reversible technology varies
according to the weight put by the regulating authority on the environment versus the
economy. When policy makers are strongly biased towards economic activity uncertainty
might increase investment in reversible technology, since it creates an option value for
investing: ﬁrms use the investment to hedge against the uncertain prices in the permit
market. However, this positive eﬀect is partially nulliﬁed by the interplay with the irre-
versible technology. Finally, contrary to previous literature, when policy makers are more
environmentally concerned, uncertainty reduces reversible investment. This is because in
some cases it is more proﬁtable for ﬁrms to face uncertainty by adjusting their output ex
post.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model while section 1.3
presents the methodology and the results. In Section 1.4 the welfare analysis is presented
and, ﬁnally, Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
We develop a model of three sequential periods, which encompasses the key elements of
a cap-and-trade system. As in the actual market for permits, ﬁrms have to decide on
their investment strategy before knowing with certainty the future amount of permits
they will be entitled to. Once the cap is set and ﬁrms decide on their production levels,
4
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the price is endogenously determined by the interplay of ﬁrms’ supply and demand of
allowances. We abstract both from temporal trading and speculation, which allows us
to focus on the direct market interactions between the ﬁrms and the regulator. For the
same reason, we do not include demand side eﬀects, by assuming that ﬁrms can always
sell their production at a constant price. The model considers three diﬀerent agents: a
regulatory authority, or policy maker, and one ﬁrm from each of the two regulated sectors.
Firm 1 is representative of the power sector and ﬁrm 2 of the industrial sector. Given
the large number of installations covered by this type of schemes (the EU ETS covers
around 11 300 energy-intensive installations from 30 countries), and the fact that the
allowances are traded on electronic platforms, it is diﬃcult for any particular ﬁrm to
exert signiﬁcant market power in the market for permits. Therefore, we assume perfect
competition amongst ﬁrms in this market.6 Furthermore, we assume a continuum of
homogeneous ﬁrms within each sector and therefore consider only a representative ﬁrm
from each. This implies, in particular, that the price that prevails in the market will be
determined, in our model, as the result of the interaction of the two ﬁrms, because it
represents the actions taken by the entire market. Finally, all agents are risk neutral.
1.2.1 The regulator
As laid out in the introduction, we focus on the eﬀect of having uncertainty over the policy
maker’s preferences. Although a long term target for the cap is set out in advance, the
policy maker decides period by period on the actual limit in eﬀect for that given trad-
ing period (phase), which might be tighter or looser than the average, according to the
importance she puts in environmental concerns versus economic outcomes. This diﬀer-
ence in preferences might derive from priority revisions resulting from business cycles,7
unexpected changes in the technological innovation path, diﬀerent political preferences of
changing governments, or even the presence and inﬂuence of political lobbies. Considering
that a standard payoﬀ period for a low-carbon investment is between 15 and 20 years,
when ﬁrms make their investment decisions, their payoﬀ is uncertain - particularly, in-
vestment in low-carbon technology is more proﬁtable if the forthcoming emission cap is
6This is true even though allowances are not distributed equally amongst ﬁrms: in the EU ETS, power
companies receive a much higher share of allowances. However, the model can be extended to include some
market power amongst the ﬁrms in the electricity generating sector.
7In particular, whenever there is an economic recession, the government in power might choose to loosen
the cap, so as to bolster the economy.
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tighter, and vice-versa.
An example of policy uncertainty in the context of the EU ETS is presented in Fig.1.1. It
Figure 1.1: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2003. Source: European Commission.
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depicts the information available to the ﬁrms in 2003 and the realized cap for the ﬁrst and
the second trading periods. In fact, in 2003 ﬁrms were aware of the aggregate cap level
for the ﬁrst trading period (2005-2007) and they had expectations on the second phase
cap (the dashed line). In 2007 the European Commission announced a second-phase cap
signiﬁcantly lower than the expected one due to the unforeseen over-allocation of the ﬁrst
phase. The diﬀerence between the expected cap for 2008-2012 (dashed line) and the re-
alized one (the solid line) proves evidence of the uncertainty around the future policy,
namely the aggregate cap. A similar description for the other EU ETS periods can be
found in Appendix 1.A.
We model this uncertainty through a parameter, γ˜, measuring the weight put by the policy
maker on economic expansion, proxied by the ﬁrms’ proﬁts, while (1 − γ˜) is the weight
put on the disutility from CO2 emissions. This preference parameter can take two values:
γ˜ =
⎧⎨
⎩γ + τ with probability qγ − τ with probability (1− q)
6
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It can be high with probability q, or low with probability (1 − q). Firms know the value
of q, γ and τ , but they do not know the exact realization of γ˜ a priori, namely when they
make their investment decisions. This value becomes known to ﬁrms only in the second
period, when uncertainty is realized. The regulator sets the cap so as to maximize the
following objective function:
R(e¯; γ˜) = γ˜
[
2∑
i=1
πi,s
]
− (1− γ˜)φe¯ (1.1)
s = h, l; i = 1, 2
where πi,s is the proﬁt in state s of ﬁrms 1 (power sector) and 2 (industry) and φe is
the damage function that represents the disutility from CO2 emissions, as described in
Scott (1994) and Germain et al. (2004). This function consists of a parameter, φ, which
quantiﬁes not only the marginal immediate damage of CO2 emissions, but also comprises a
measure of their long-run social and economic cost, due to climate change,8 and e, the cap
set by the policy maker, which therefore corresponds to the total amount of CO2 emitted
by ﬁrms. We assume that the damage is linear in the emissions, so that the parameter
represents their actual marginal cost.9 In principle, tightening the cap has two eﬀects:
a substitution eﬀect, as ﬁrms substitute from the carbon-intensive input towards cleaner
technologies, and an output eﬀect, because ﬁrms might ﬁnd it proﬁtable to decrease their
production in order to decrease emissions.
1.2.2 The ﬁrms
The representative ﬁrms diﬀer in their productivity, αi, their available choice of fuels, and
their cost of investment in clean technologies, measured by ki.
10 In particular, the ﬁrm in
the electricity sector may choose to invest in two types of low-carbon technologies:
• An irreversible clean technology (such as renewable energy sources, RES, or energy
8Such as the damage from the intensiﬁcation of natural disasters, the decrease in clean water resources,
or migration and restructuring due to the sea level rise.
9A linear damage function has been used in similar analyses (see, for example, (Scott, 1994) and (Colla
et al., 2012)).
10For now, we assume throughout that both sectors have the same size. However, the model can easily
be extended to include diﬀerent shares among sectors.
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eﬃciency enhancing technologies) which we consider irreversible, since after invest-
ment takes place the ﬁrm is locked-in to its use.11
• A reversible technology, namely fuel switching in production, which requires building
a second plant that produces using gas,12 and paying a ﬁxed cost, F . However, once
the investment is made and uncertainty over the cap is resolved, the ﬁrm has the
opportunity to switch back to the coal-using plant, if the realized cap was higher than
the expected, given that operating costs of coal are always lower than those of gas.
We assume the ﬁrm operates with only one of the plants at a time.13 Accordingly,
we consider the availability to switch between fuels a reversible technology. The
investment decision is of a discrete nature: to build or not the new gas plant. We
consider this option a low-carbon technology because gas releases only around 80% of
the amount of CO2 emitted by coal. This coupled with the fact that lower amounts
of fuel are necessary, since the productivity of gas is usually much higher, leads to a
much lower total level of emissions from production. The relevance of gas as energy
source for power companies is illustrated in the table in Appendix 1.B.
On the contrary, ﬁrm 2 has only the option to invest in the irreversible clean technology.14
Both clean technologies are continuous variables.
The ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions can be described as:
π1(a1, e1, G1; e¯) = max{π1,e(a1, e1; e¯), π1,G(a1, G1; e¯)} (1.2)
π1,e(a1, e1; e¯) = α1,e(a1 + a¯)e1 − ce21 − ps
(
e1 − e¯
2
)
− k1a21 (1.3)
π1,G(a1, G1; e¯) = α1,G(a1 + a¯)G1 − gG21 − ps
(
λG1 − e¯
2
)
− k1a21 − F (1.4)
11Regarding RES, since there are nearly no operating costs, once these investments take place, the ﬁrm
always uses them.
12Almost all the existing coal plants burn pulverized coal in a boiler to generate steam which then drives
a steam turbine. Replacing the existent coal-burners to burn gas would reduce consistently the eﬃciency
of the gas plant. For instance, a retroﬁt gas plant would have an average of 37% eﬃciency whereas a new
CCGT has on average 58% eﬃciency. Therefore almost all the companies build a new gas plant.
13That is, we assume that both plants are big enough so that the company operates with only one of
them at a time according to the merit order.
14For example, a cooling system installed in a cement installation.
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for ﬁrm 1, where the proﬁt will be the maximum between the proﬁt using coal for pro-
duction and the proﬁt using gas for production, and
π2,e(a2, e2; e¯) = α2,e(a2 + a¯)e2 − ce22 − ps
(
e2 − e¯
2
)
− k2a22 (1.5)
for ﬁrm 2. Each ﬁrm has a two-input production function, where one of them is a fossil fuel
- coal (e2), for ﬁrm 2, and coal (e1) or gas (G1) for ﬁrm 1 - and the other is clean technology
- a2 for ﬁrm 2 and a1 for ﬁrm 1. Our measure of coal has a one to one correspondence
with carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. We assume that fossil fuels and clean technology
are complementary inputs and for mathematical tractability we consider a multiplicative
production function. This complementarity is justiﬁed by technological considerations.15
Given that the proﬁt is expressed in monetary terms, these functions imply that the ﬁrms’
proﬁts are given by the revenues from their sales, minus the costs of using gas or coal,
which consist of the operating costs of the inputs plus the permits trading cost, and minus
investment costs. The productivity of the combination of the inputs, which includes the
price of the output, is given by αi. Due to their physical properties α1,G > α1,e. Moreover,
a¯ represents the existing level of clean technologies for the two sectors. This formulation
allows ﬁrms to set the level of investment in clean technology to zero, if optimal, still
having a positive production level. We assume the same a for both sectors.
We assume convex costs of coal and gas, which assures that the proﬁt functions are concave
in the production inputs. This is satisﬁed as long as 4cki−α2i,e > 0, i = 1, 2 (See Condition
1, Section 3.1). The cost structure captures not only the price of the fuels, but also the
storage costs of these inputs, as well as their opportunity cost - both of which increase
exponentially for high quantities of fuels. Because the price of gas is historically higher on
average than the price of coal, we also consider g > c.
The second part of the proﬁt concerns the permit trading part which is the net demand for
permits ((e− e/2) or (λG− e/2)) multiplied by the endogenous permit price (ps = p(es)),
which is a function of the total amount of allowances (es). The cap is assumed to be
shared equally amongst the ﬁrms,16 and λ is the proportion of CO2 emitted by one unit
15Renewables are intermittent energy resources and very diﬃcult or costly to store, hence the aggregate
supply of electricity always uses a mix of fossil fuels and RES. EF, on the other hand, are investments that
make these fuels more productive, by reducing the energy wasted during the cycle, and must, therefore,
always be used along with the latter.
16The ex-ante allocation does not aﬀect eﬃciency, as the permit trading reallocates them eﬃciently;
what matters is the aggregate level.
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of gas, as compared to that of one unit of coal. If the net demand is positive, the ﬁrm
is emitting more than what it is entitled to, and therefore is a net buyer of allowances.
On the contrary, if a ﬁrm manages to decrease its emission level below its allocation of
permits, then it is a net seller in the market for allowances.
Finally, kia
2
i is the cost of investing in the irreversible technology. We assume, as it is
standard in the literature,17 that the cost of investing in this technology is convex.
1.2.3 Timing
The agents’ actions take place as follows: in the ﬁrst period, the two ﬁrms make their
investment decisions, according to their expectation of the forthcoming cap; in the second
period uncertainty is realized and the policy maker decides on the aggregate amount of
permits, by maximizing her objective function; and in the last period, ﬁrms set their
production levels, so as to maximize proﬁts, by adjusting their fuel choices. They trade
permits and the market clears, giving rise to the equilibrium price of allowances. This
timeline is set out in Fig.1.2.
Figure 1.2: Timeline
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1.3 Methodology and Results
In order to better isolate the mechanisms in eﬀect, we ﬁrst explore two reduced settings:
one where only the irreversible investment (the choice of ai) is available, which means that
17After the seminal contribution of Montgomery (1972), several papers have assumed convex abatement
costs - for example, Fell and Morgenstern (2009).
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ﬁrms can improve their energy eﬃciency or invest in RES, and the alternative situation
where only reversible investment for the electricity sector - investment in a gas plant - can
be made.
1.3.1 Irreversible Investment in Isolation
We start with the ﬁrst case. When only irreversible investment is available, the ﬁrms’
proﬁt functions reduce to:
πi,e,s(e, a; e¯s) = αi,e(ai + a¯)ei,s − ce2i,s − ps
(
ei − e¯s
2
)
− kia2i (1.6)
i = 1, 2; s = h, l
where s stands for the realization of the state, which can be high (γ˜h = γ + τ) or low
(γ˜l = γ − τ). In this reduced setting ﬁrms diﬀer only on their productivity, αi and their
cost of abatement parameter, ki.
We solve the model by backward induction.18 In t = 3, after the cap has been set and
uncertainty is revealed, the ﬁrms decide on their output levels by adjusting their fuel (which
consists here of coal, ei), according to the observed cap. They do so by maximizing their
last period proﬁt, given by (6) net of sunk costs, with respect to the coal level, taking the
price, the allocation and their ﬁrst period choices as given. The resulting optimal level of
coal is, then, given by:
e∗i,s(ps) =
−ps + αi(ai + a¯)
2c
(1.7)
for i = 1, 2; s = h, l, where the star indicates an equilibrium level and ps = p(e¯s). This
optimal quantity depends positively on the productivity parameter αi,e, on the investment
in clean technology ai, and on its starting level a¯. This happens because the marginal
productivity of ei is given by αi,e(ai+ a¯), which makes the complementarity eﬀect between
inputs to be larger than the substitution eﬀect.19 Lastly, the optimal coal level depends
negatively on the price for permits, ps, and on the parameter measuring operating costs,
c.
The two ﬁrms then exchange permits, according to their production needs, and the market
18As ﬁrms do not act strategically, the model could also be solved by forward induction.
19This is true for any other choice of production function which embodies any (even very small) degree
of complementarity between inputs.
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clears. The equilibrium price is given by the following market clearing condition, for each
of the two s states:
e∗1,s(ps) + e
∗
2,s(ps) = e¯s (1.8)
which, solving for ps, gives us the price that clears the market:
p∗s =
1
2
[α1(a1 + a¯) + α2(a2 + a¯)− 2ce¯s] (1.9)
This price depends negatively on e¯s and c, and positively on the average productivity of
coal. Intuitively, exogenous increases in the productivity of coal make it more proﬁtable
and so boost the demand for permits, thereby increasing its price. On the contrary,
a decrease in operational costs c diminishes coal demand and consequently reduces the
allowances’ price. Finally, increases in the total amount of available permits e¯s reduce
their price, and vice-versa. This negative relation between e¯s and p
∗
s means, in particular,
that the price level associated with γ˜h, ph, will be lower (or equal) than that associated
with γ˜l, pl.
Next, we study the policy maker’s behavior. In t = 2, she chooses the cap by maximizing
her objective function, according to her type s, taking into account her eﬀect on the ﬁrms’
last period choices. Her objective function is given by:
Rs(e¯s) = γ˜s
[
2∑
i=1
πi,s(ai, e
∗
i ; e¯s)
]
− (1− γ˜s)φes (1.10)
s = h, l
where ﬁrms’ proﬁts are given by (1.6), substituting in the equilibrium values e∗i,s.
The resulting equilibrium cap is a function only of the parameters describing the economy
and ai:
e¯∗s =
(a1 + a¯)α1γ˜s + (a2 + a¯)α2γ˜s + 2φ(γ˜s − 1)
2cγ˜s
, s = h, l (1.11)
The optimal cap e¯∗s depends positively on the weight the regulator puts on the economy,
γ˜s, and negatively on the marginal damage of emissions, φ, since γ˜s−1 > 0. Re-arranging
the expression, it can be seen that the existence of a positive cap is guaranteed by the
12
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following maximum for the marginal damage parameter:
φ <
γ
(1− γ)
1
2
[α1(a1 + a¯) + α2(a2 + a¯)] (1.12)
which means the marginal damage has to be smaller than the average coal productivity
in the market weighted by the relative preference of the regulator for the economy.
As in Colla et al. (2012), if the marginal damage of emissions is too large, the regulator is
better oﬀ setting the cap to zero and having no production (and zero emissions). Therefore,
for the rest of the analysis, we assume that φ is smaller than the threshold, and incorporate
this condition in the following maximizations.
Finally, we study ﬁrms’ investment decision in the ﬁrst period. In t = 1, ﬁrms face
uncertainty regarding the policy maker’s preference parameter γ˜, and therefore regarding
the cap and the market price for permits. They expect, with probability q, that the
regulator is of a high type (i.e., more concerned about the economy), and therefore sets
the associated cap, e¯h, and with probability (1 − q) that she is of a low type (more
environmentally biased), and thus sets the associated cap, e¯l.
20 Therefore, they choose
their investment levels by maximizing the following expected proﬁt function with respect
to ai:
E(πi,e(ai; e¯)|γ, τ, q) = q[αi,e(ai + a¯)e∗i,h − ce∗2i,h − p(e¯h)(e∗i,h −
e¯h
2
)− kia2i t] (1.13)
+(1− q)[αi,e(ai + a¯)e∗i,l − ce∗2i,l − p(e¯l)((e∗i,l −
el
2
)− kia2i ]
i = 1, 2
In doing so, for each of the two states they take into account the last period optimal
levels of coal, the prices and the caps. Solving the ﬁrst order conditions for ai, we get the
optimum investment level in clean technology, as a function of the expected price:
a∗i (ph, pl) =
α1[a¯α1 − qph − (1− q)pl]
4ck1 − α21
20Although ﬁrms act as price takers and do not take into account their own eﬀect on the price or the
cap, they can assess exactly how these depend on the policy maker’s preferences. So, they associate with
each state s a certain level of permits, e¯s, and price p(e¯s).
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Substituting in the equilibrium price we have:
a∗i =
(αi,e(−α2j,e ˆ¯e+ 2kj [a(αi,e − αj,e) + 2cˆ¯e]))
16ckikj − 2
(
kjα2i,e + kiα
2
j,e
) (1.14)
for i = 1, 2, j = 3− i, where ˆ¯e = [qe¯h + (1− q)e¯l]. This quantity is always positive as long
as the following two conditions are maintained:
4cki − α2i,e > 0, i = 1, 2 (1.15)
[qeh + (1− q)el] ≥ −2kj a¯(αi − αj)
(4ck2 − α2j )
(1.16)
for i = 1, 2, j = 3− i. The ﬁrst condition regards the comparison between marginal costs
and marginal productivity of ai and ei. The second one means that for a
∗
i to be non-
negative the expected cap cannot be too tight. This is because under such a cap level
ﬁrms are better oﬀ setting ei to zero, and consequently not producing. As long as these
conditions are maintained, existence and uniqueness of a∗i and e
∗
i are guaranteed.
The derivative of a∗i with respect to the expected cap, [qeh + (1− q)el], is always positive
under the ﬁrst condition. This eﬀect takes place due to the complementarity with ei, and
means that also a∗i depends negatively on the price of ei,s. However, these eﬀects are
larger for e∗i,s than for a
∗
i , so that the clean technology to coal ratio actually increases with
increases in the price.21 Additionally, a∗i depends negatively on ki, so that the ﬁrm with
lower costs of abatement invests more in equilibrium, and vice-versa.
Substituting the equilibrium cap in the optimal levels of inputs and vice-versa, we ﬁnd
that both inputs increase with an increase in γ˜s and decrease with increases in φ, which
carries over from their eﬀect on the cap. The same substitution in conditions (1.12) and
(1.16) shows (1.12) is always more binding, so that we take only this one. Thus, the
conditions guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of non-negative equilibrium quantities
are the following:
Condition 1
4cki − α2i,e > 0, i = 1, 2
21Similar to the workings of the capital to labor ratio in most production functions.
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Condition 2
φ ≤ a¯α(γ
2 − τ2)
γ − τ(1− 2q)− (γ2 − τ2)
where α = min{α1, α2}.
We ﬁnally investigate the eﬀect of uncertainty on investment in clean technology. We do
so by studying the eﬀect of an increase in the spread of γ˜s, which essentially means an in-
crease in τ . We ﬁrst assume that uncertainty parameter follows a mean preserving spread
(MPS) process, so that each of the possible states occurs with the same probability (i.e.,
q = 12). Comparing the optimal values of ai in the case of full information (τ = 0) with
those of uncertainty (τ = 0), we ﬁnd the that both at an aggregate level (A = ∑2i=1 ai)
and at installation levels investment is always lower in the latter case. Additionally, we
ﬁnd that
∂a∗i
∂τ < 0, so that the investment levels monotonically decrease with uncertainty.
This result is perfectly in line with the predictions of the Real Option Theory and derives
from the fact that a higher level of irreversible investment implies less ﬂexibility to deal
with future uncertainty. Lastly, we consider a non-MPS, and ﬁnd that, whenever q < 12
the results are maintained, and for q > 12 , they only change whenever τ > τˆ = γ(2q − 1).
This means that increases in τ only have a positive eﬀect on irreversible investment for
the particular case where the probability that the realization is γ˜h = (γ + τ) is very high,
so that increases in τ mean increases in the average cap. Increasing uncertainty in this
case would simply increase the expected cap because the probability of a high realization
is so large. Our results so far are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 If the stochastic process follows a mean-preserving spread, irreversible
investment is always lower under uncertainty than with full information, both at an ag-
gregate level and at an installation level. Moreover, the higher the uncertainty, the lower
the the investment.
Proposition 2 If the stochastic process does not follow a mean-preserving spread, and
q < 12 the results are maintained. If q >
1
2 , irreversible investment is lower in than in the
certainty case if and only if τ > τˆ .
15
Chapter 1. Policy Uncertainty and Investment in Low-Carbon Technology
1.3.2 Reversible Investment in Isolation
In the second scenario we explore, ﬁrms do not have the option of investing in the irre-
versible technology, but the electricity generating company may take advantage of fuel
switching. In this case, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt functions are given by equations (1.2)
to (1.5) setting ai to zero.
22 The proﬁts when using coal and gas for production are,
respectively, given by:
πi,e(ei; e¯) = αi,eei − ce2i − p(e¯)
(
ei − e
2
)
, i = 1, 2 (1.17)
π1,G(G1; e¯) = α1,GG1 − gG21 − p(e¯)
(
λG1 − e¯
2
)
− F (1.18)
Since this problem involves not only continuous decisions (the optimal levels of ei and G1),
but also discrete choices by ﬁrm 1 (whether to invest in the gas plant in t = 1 and which
plant to use in t = 3) we follow a somewhat diﬀerent methodology for solving it.
To begin with, we distinguish the possible behavior of the electricity company, with respect
to its discrete choices. While with full information (i.e. price and cap known in t = 1)
the power company invests in the new plant only if in the last period it is proﬁtable to
use gas instead of coal, under uncertainty this condition is maintained only under certain
values of the fundamentals (τ , γ and φ). For other values, however, the company might
not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to use gas, after having invested, depending of the realization of γ˜. In
the latter case, if the regulator is more biased towards the environment (γ˜ = γ˜l), the cap
is tighter, the permits’ price is higher and, for given fuel prices, it is more proﬁtable for
the ﬁrm to produce by using gas, which requires it to hold a lower quantity of permits.23
On the contrary, if the regulator is more willing to boost the economic activity γ˜ = γ˜h,
the cap is higher, the allowances’ price is lower, and the ﬁrm prefers to use the option to
switch back to coal, given that c < g. Consequently, we distinguish between three possible
cases, which correspond to the two discrete decisions of ﬁrm 1:
• Case 1 (NI): Firm 1 does not invest;
22Since a¯ is ﬁxed, it becomes just an increase in productivity. So, we can set it to 1 without loss of
generality, leaving the ﬁrms with a one-input production function.
23Recall from Section II that gas emits less CO2 than coal and it is also more productive.
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• Case 2 (INS): Firm 1 invests and never switches;
• Case 3 (IS): Firm 1 invests and⎧⎨
⎩switches if γ˜ = γ˜hdoes not switch if γ˜ = γ˜l
Note what diﬀerentiates the last two cases are the fundamentals, namely the values of γ,τ
and q, which are known by all agents from the ﬁrst period, while what matters for the
switching decision of the ﬁrm in the third case is particular realization of γ˜. We start
by studying the two investment conditions: one assuming the fundamentals are such that
ﬁrm 1 never switches after having invested - and so we compare ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt in the
ﬁrst two cases (INS versus NI ); and another assuming that ﬁrm 1 might switch after the
investment - for which we perform the comparison between ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt in third and
ﬁrst cases (IS versus NI ).
The most interesting case, however, is the latter, since it involves the situation where the
ﬁrm switches and takes advantage of the reversibility of the technology. Thus, we assume
the conditions are such that if the ﬁrm invests, it will switch to coal when γ˜ = γ + τ , and
solve the model for this case. In order to ﬁnd an equilibrium, we ﬁrst assume it is not
optimal for the ﬁrm to invest, and calculate the optimal quantities in a similar fashion to
the case of only irreversible technology. The policy maker’s cap is, thus, her best response
to the quantities in the case where the ﬁrm is not investing in the gas plant, according to
her type (h or l). We then assume it is optimal to invest and repeat the procedure.24 All
the equilibrium quantities, e∗i,s, e¯
∗
s and p
∗
s, for each of the two cases (NI and IS ), have the
same properties as the ones derived above, and G∗1,s is analogous to the optimal level of
coal. Additionally, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium, ﬁrm 2’s choices of e∗2,s are equal for both
24Notice that the cap set by the regulator in equilibrium is diﬀerent depending on whether the ﬁrm
invested or not. Due to market interactions, the optimal level of coal resulting from ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt maxi-
mization in this case might also be diﬀerent from that of the case where ﬁrm 1 does not invest.
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the NI and IS cases. The resulting expected proﬁts for ﬁrm 1 are, therefore,
E[π1,NI(e
∗
s; e¯
∗
s,NI)] = q[α1,ee
∗
h − ce∗2h − p∗h,NI(e∗h −
e¯∗h,NI
2
)]
+ (1− q)[α1,ee∗l − ce∗2l − p∗l,NI(e∗l −
e¯∗l,NI
2
)] (1.19)
E[π1,IS(e
∗
h, G
∗
l ; e¯
∗
s,IS)] = q[α1,ee
∗
h − ce∗2h − p∗h,SI(e∗h −
e¯∗h,SI
2
)]
+ (1− q)[α1,GG∗l − gG∗2l − p∗l,SI(λG∗l −
e¯∗l,SI
2
)] (1.20)
for s = h, l.25
In order to explore the ﬁrm’s investment decision, we need to compare the two expected
proﬁts. However, since the ﬁrm is a price taker, it does not take into account its own eﬀect
on the price and the cap. Therefore, when the company makes its investment decision it
does not compare the two expected proﬁts described above directly.
Our equilibrium is, therefore, constructed in the following manner. We ﬁrst assume it
is an equilibrium for the representative ﬁrm to invest. This means all the continuum of
ﬁrms invest, so that the equilibrium cap and price are e¯∗s,IS and p
∗
s,IS . Then, we check
if this is the case; that is, if there does not exist any proﬁtable deviation. We do so by
comparing the proﬁt of the representative ﬁrm when investing (and switching) with that
of not investing, when the cap and the price are those prevailing assuming the ﬁrm is
investing:
E[π1,IS(e
∗
h, G
∗
l ; e¯
∗
s,IS , p
∗
s,IS)]− E[π1,NI(e∗h, e∗l ; e¯∗s,IS , p∗s,IS)] > 0, s = h, l (1.21)
We then repeat the procedure assuming it is an equilibrium not to invest, and compare:
E[π1,NI(e
∗
h, e
∗
l ; e¯
∗
s,NI , p
∗
s,NI)]− E[π1,IS(e∗h, G∗l ; e¯∗s,NI , p∗s,NI)] > 0, s = h, l (1.22)
Considering, once again, a MPS we ﬁnd that there is a threshold on F , F th, such that,
for F < F th ﬁrm 1 is better oﬀ investing, both when the cap is e¯∗s,IS and e¯
∗
s,NI , and prices
25The expected proﬁt for ﬁrm 2 is analogous to the previous case.
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are p∗s,IS and p
∗
s,NI . The opposite is true when F > F
th.26
We therefore ﬁnd a unique equilibrium, given the fundamentals of the economy, consisting
of the equilibrium quantities above, the system of beliefs of ﬁrms, given by q, the threshold
for investment and the condition for switching, determined further below.
Finally, for easiness of interpretation, we analyze the equilibrium imposing restrictions on
some of the parameters that are not central to our analysis. The calibration procedure
is described in Appendix 1.C. With these values, we plot equations (1.21) and (1.22). In
Fig.1.3 we present the graph for the particular case of γ = 0.5 and φ = 280, which in our
framework describe a policy maker with balanced preferences. The ﬁgure shows that, for
Figure 1.3: Investment decision for ﬁrm 1
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F < F th, the ﬁrm has a higher proﬁt when investing in the gas plant, both when the cap
is set optimally for this choice (positive part of the curve representing (1.21)) and when
the cap is set optimally for NI (negative part of curve (1.22)). For F > F th the ﬁrm no
longer has an incentive to invest: equation (1.21) becomes negative, and (1.22) positive,
meaning that for any of the two caps, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ not investing.
The same procedure was followed to ﬁnd an equilibrium in the case where the ﬁrm never
switches to coal, once it has invested (INS ). We ﬁnd that the threshold for investing is
26We assume that, when indiﬀerent, i.e., F = F th, the ﬁrm invests.
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larger since the company is willing to pay more for an investment that it is sure it will
use. In a similar graph to that of Fig.1.3, this corresponds to a jump of the two curves to
the right.
To complete the analysis for the reversible technology case, we ﬁnd the conditions under
which the ﬁrm switches. We proceed in the same manner as before, by assuming an
equilibrium in the last period, and then checking for proﬁtable deviations. Additionally,
and since the regulator can inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s decision to switch because the cap is set
before this, we compare her utility under each of the cases, to ﬁnd unique conditions.
We ﬁnd that the switching decision depends on a the relative environmental preference
of the regulator weighted by the marginal emission damage:
ϕ =
(1− γ)
γ
φ (1.23)
In particular, we ﬁnd a critical point, ϕth, for which the switching decision depends on τ .
Speciﬁcally:
1. If ϕ < ϕth, ∀τ whenever ﬁrm 1 invests it switches for a high realization;
2. If ϕ > ϕth, the ﬁrm switches only if τ > τ th (i.e., if the spread of the uncertainty
parameter is very high).
The eﬀect of uncertainty on this reversible investment depends on the region of these
parameters:
• If we are in the ﬁrst case (ϕ < ϕth) and the ﬁrm always switches, then increases in
the spread of γ˜s (τ) increase the threshold for investing, F
th, so that there is more
investment in equilibrium. This eﬀect can be seen in Fig.1.3 as a movement of all
the curves to the right.
• Whenever ϕ > ϕth, and τ < τ th, the ﬁrm does not switch, and, therefore, investing
in the gas plant is equivalent to an irreversible investment.27 Therefore, the eﬀect
of uncertainty is negative.28
27This result is in line with the analysis of Blyth et al. (2007).
28In the analogous graph to the one in Fig.1.3, but for the comparison between NI and INS, which we
do not present due to space restrictions, the two curves move to the left as τ increases, decreasing the
threshold for investment.
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• Finally, in the case where ϕ > ϕth and τ > τ th, the ﬁrm switches under the high
realization of uncertainty, but increases in τ lead to decreases in investment.
Our results diﬀer from those of Chen and Tseng (2011), where reversible investment al-
ways increases with uncertainty, due to the output eﬀect: because ﬁrms are able to adjust
their fuel quantities after uncertainty is resolved, they ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to decrease
production than investing in a gas plant, if there is the possibility of a very low level of the
cap, which follows from the existence of an environmentally-biased regulator (ϕ > ϕth)
and a high level of uncertainty (τ > τ th).
Proposition 3 If ﬁrms are allowed to vary their output, reversible investment in-
creases with uncertainty only for some values of the fundamentals of the economy.
In a nutshell, if the authority is more biased towards the economy (either because the
marginal damage is high, or γ is low), then uncertainty may have a positive eﬀect on
reversible investment, when it is considered in isolation. On the other hand, when the
policy maker is more environmentally-oriented (either because γ is very high, or φ is low),
uncertainty is never beneﬁcial for investment.
1.3.3 Complete Environment
We now turn to the complete model, where both reversible and irreversible investments
are available for the power generating ﬁrm, and the latter for the ﬁrm representative of
the industrial sector. The procedure for solving is similar to that of subsection 1.3.2, but
incorporating the ﬁrst period choices of ai, as determined in subsection 1.3.1.
Firms now have diﬀerent optimal decisions on the level of clean technology according to
the discrete reversible investment choice of ﬁrm 1: a∗j , j = INS, IS,NI. This is because
the power sector company adjusts its level of the irreversible technology, so as to maximize
its proﬁt, according to the productivity associated to the fuel it expects to use. Then,
due to market interactions that aﬀect the prevailing cap, we also allow ﬁrm 2 to decide on
diverse levels of investment according to the fuel choices of ﬁrm 1, although in equilibrium,
we ﬁnd that they do not diﬀer. This gives rise, in equilibrium, to three diﬀerent levels of
irreversible investment for ﬁrm 1, one for each of the three cases (NI, IS, INS ) and only
one for ﬁrm 2. When comparing these results with those of the model in subsection 1.3.1,
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we ﬁnd that a∗1,INS > a
∗
1;IS > a
∗
1,NI = a
∗
1,isol.
29 This means that the higher the probability
of the ﬁrm using gas in production, the higher is the level of a∗1.30
All the comparative statics for the equilibrium levels of the continuous variables above
are maintained. In particular, aggregate investment in the irreversible technology always
decreases with uncertainty.
As for the discrete choice of switching, we follow the procedure described before to ﬁnd
a threshold on (1−γ)γ φ, call it ϕ
th′ , for which the decision to change fuels once invested
depends on τ . Our results conﬁrm that, also in the full setting, when the government is
more biased towards the environment, ϕ > ϕth
′
, the power company switches whenever
τ > τ th, and uncertainty always decreases investment in the reversible technology. How-
ever, in the case of a government more incline towards economic activity, i.e. ϕ < ϕth
′
,
where ﬁrm 1 decides to switch for any τ > 0 after investing, the results change when
the choice of the irreversible technology is included in the model. The present scenario is
characterized by two features: ﬁrstly, for low levels of uncertainty the ﬁrm never invests;
secondly, the positive eﬀect of uncertainty on the reversible investment level, observed in
isolation, vanishes for high levels of τ . Fig.1.4 depicts the threshold for investment, F th, as
a function of τ for a given ϕ < ϕth
′
and it allows to identify these outcomes.31 There are
Figure 1.4: Investment in Reversible Technology
29The level of a∗2 remains unchanged.
30This is because, on average, a1 represents an addition to the productivity of the fuel, as the two inputs
are complements.
31We again use the calibration described in Appendix 1.C. We set again γ = 0.5 and now φ = 150, such
that the constraint on ϕ is satisﬁed.
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four regions of interest and, consequently, three additional thresholds for τ . For low levels
of uncertainty, τ < τ1, reversible investment increases with uncertainty as in subsection 3.2
but ﬁrms never invest. This is because, even if F = 0, the ﬁrm always has a lower proﬁt
investing in the gas plant than not investing. This eﬀect can be traced to the equilibrium
behavior of the regulator: the introduction of the possibility of ai in the ﬁrms’ production
functions allows the policy maker to lower the cap, since the same level of production can
be attained emitting less CO2. This lower limit on emissions, in turn, decreases both the
equilibrium levels of e1,s and G1,s which, as set out before, decrease the ﬁrm’s expected
proﬁt in diﬀerent ways. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function π1,G is much more respon-
sive to changes in Gi,s than π1,e is to changes in e1,s, so that
∂π1,G
∂e¯ >
∂π1,e
∂e¯ . Additionally,
this relationship is not linear in e¯: for higher values of the cap, the variation in proﬁts
is higher than for lower ones. Consequently, the introduction of ai leads an economically
biased authority to set a cap for which it is no longer proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to invest in a
gas plant. In the case of the more environmental policy maker described above, however,
this eﬀect is not enough to eliminate investment, due to the lower expected cap associated
with this regulator type.
The second region refers to τ1 < τ < τ2, where the power company invests in the reversible
technology and uncertainty maintains the positive eﬀect on investment found in subsection
3.2 as it represents a means to insure itself against future potential high permits price.
When τ > τ2, however, uncertainty has a negative eﬀect over investment in the reversible
technology. This is derives from the negative impact of uncertainty over the irreversible
investment. Since the proﬁt of the ﬁrm using gas is more sensitive to changes in the level
of the clean technology, aIS , than the the proﬁt when using coal, it decreases faster as aIS
diminishes. This eﬀect now prevails over the hedging motive and reversible investment
decreases with uncertainty. Thus for τ2 < τ < τ3, the ﬁrm still invests but the higher the
uncertainty the less the investment made is. Additionally, for τ > τ3 the ﬁrm does not
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest, for any ﬁxed cost F. The following proposition summarizes this
result:
Proposition 4 In a comprehensive setting with output variation the introduction of
irreversible investment decisions partly eliminates the possibility of a positive eﬀect of un-
certainty on reversible investment found for governments biased towards the economy.
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We further study the second threshold for τ , which is derived as the value for which
∂πIS
∂τ = 0, and captures the point where there is a change in the sign of the eﬀect that
uncertainty has over reversible investment. Fig.1.5 plots this threshold for diﬀerent levels
of γ and for a given marginal damage φ = 50. If τ is below the threshold, namely within
Figure 1.5: Threshold for positive eﬀect
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the shaded area, uncertainty leads to a higher investment level. On the contrary, for τ
higher than the threshold uncertainty has a negative eﬀect on investment. The triangle
delimitates the maximum τ possible for each value of γ, so that τ has a positive eﬀect on
reversible investment only in the shaded area under the triangle. Note that τ2 is increasing
with γ. This means that for policy makers more biased towards the economy,32, the higher
their bias, measured by γ for given φ, the higher the maximum level of uncertainty that
stimulates investment.
The main results of the complete model can be summarized in Table 1.1.
32Recall that we are in the case of ϕ < ϕth
′
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Table 1.1: Final eﬀect of uncertainty on investment
Parameters Preferences Uncertainty
Reversible
Uncertainty
Irreversible
ϕ > ϕth
′
Environment Negative Negative
ϕ < ϕth
′
Economy
Positive if τ < τ2 Negative
Negative if τ > τ2 Negative
In a setting which mimics the real world interaction in investment decisions, these
results mean that if the authority has clear long run environmental goals such as the
Kyoto Protocol, policy uncertainty is not likely beneﬁcial for any type of investment
in low-carbon technology. On the contrary, for an emerging country clearly prioritizing
economic growth or for a developed one with a strong industrial lobby, such as the United
States of America, some level of uncertainty might stimulate the development of a low-
carbon economy. In fact, this uncertainty will allow for a transition period through the
use of a less carbon-intensive fuel (gas), towards the implementation of clean technology,
such as renewable energy and energy eﬃciency.
1.4 Welfare Analysis
In the previous sections we focused solely on understanding the channels through which
uncertainty aﬀects investment in low-carbon technology. We now turn to the question of
how much uncertainty, and therefore investment, is optimal from a welfare perspective.
Following Colla et al. (2012) and Germain et al. (2004) in similar analysis, we use the
regulator’s objective function as a measure of aggregate welfare. This means that ex-
ante welfare is a weighted average of the proﬁts in the economy and the disutility of the
environmental damage from emissions. We therefore perform a partial welfare analysis
that does not consider other uncertainties that might interact with the optimality of the
decision-making process - for example, policy uncertainty may be beneﬁcial in terms of
welfare if it acts as a stabilizer for the economy, of if the ﬂexibility it entails allows the
policymaker to adjust the stringency cap to the current state of technological process.
As in the investment analysis, our results diﬀer depending on the parameter regions that
deﬁne the optimal choices of the ﬁrms - that is, on ϕ. Accordingly, expected welfare for
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an environmentally concerned government, E(Wen), becomes the following discontinuous
function:
E(Wen) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
qR
(
G∗1,h, e
∗
2,h, a
∗
1, a
∗
2, e¯
∗
h,INS
)
+ (1− q)R (G∗1,l, e∗2,l, a∗1, a∗2, e¯∗l,INS
)
if τ < τ th
qR
(
e∗1,h, e
∗
2,h, a
∗
1, a
∗
2, e¯
∗
h,IS
)
+ (1− q)R (G∗1,l, e∗2,l, a∗1, a∗2, e¯∗l,IS
)
if τ th < τ < τ3
qR
(
e∗1,h, e
∗
2,h, a
∗
1, a
∗
2, e¯
∗
h,IS
)
+ (1− q)R (G∗1,l, e∗2,l, a∗1, a∗2, e¯∗l,IS
)
if τ > τ3
The resulting welfare can be seen in Fig.1.6 using the calibration described in Appendix
1.C and ϕ > ϕth
′
.
Figure 1.6: Welfare function: environmentally biased authority.
The welfare function is represented by the solid lines, and the two vertical lines correspond
to the τ thresholds for switching and investing. When τ < τ th the electricity ﬁrm chooses
to invest in a gas plant and never switches back to coal. Even though the higher the
uncertainty (τ) the smaller the investment (see Section 3.3), welfare is a concave function
of uncertainty. In fact, faced with higher uncertainty, ﬁrms will decrease not only clean
technology investment but also output, and therefore emissions. The consequent positive
eﬀect of lower emissions on welfare more than oﬀsets the losses in terms of output. When
τ th < τ < τ3, the electricity ﬁrm invests in the reversible technology but switches to coal
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whenever there is a high realization of the cap. Here, the previous eﬀect is intensiﬁed
because the emission reduction is higher given that coal is more carbon-intensive than
gas. Finally, for τ > τ3, the power sector representative ﬁrm is no longer investing in
low-carbon technology, and the decreases in production driven by very low levels of the
clean technology overcome the gains from lower emissions, leading to a rapidly decreasing
welfare. Thus, for environmentally concerned governments, even though any level of un-
certainty decreases all types of investment in low-carbon technology, expected welfare is
maximized for a positive level of τ . This partial equilibrium analysis excludes however any
long-run beneﬁts of boosting investment in the short-run, both in environmental terms
and in terms of technological development.
Finally, when the government is more economically biased the ﬁrms’ optimal decisions
change and the expected welfare is deﬁned accordingly:
E(Wec) =
⎧⎨
⎩
qR
(
e∗1,h, e
∗
2,h, a
∗
1, a
∗
2, e¯
∗
h,IS
)
+ (1− q)R (G∗1,l, e∗2,l, a∗1, a∗2, e¯∗l,IS
)
if τ1 > τ > τ3
qR
(
e∗1,h, e
∗
2,h, a
∗
1, a
∗
2, e¯
∗
h,NI
)
+ (1− q)R (e∗1,l, e∗2,l, a∗1, a∗2, e¯∗l,NI
)
otherwise
This is depicted by the solid lines in Fig.1.7, for the same calibration and ϕ < ϕth
′
.
As the ﬁgure shows, also here the expected welfare is maximum for a positive level of
Figure 1.7: Welfare function: economically biased authority.
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uncertainty. Only in the extreme case of a very low damage of emissions (φ) welfare
would be higher for the minimum uncertainty - here, low uncertainty and cheaper permits
would allow for a high level of output without the cost of reversible investment for hedging
purposes.
1.5 Conclusion
In the context of a carbon dioxide Emission Trading Scheme, we study how uncertainty
over the policy rule, driven by periodicity of the aggregate cap, aﬀects ﬁrms’ investment in
low-carbon technologies. We formulate a three period sequential model that puts together
the two sectors regulated by the European scheme and encompasses both irreversible and
reversible investment possibilities for the ﬁrms. Additionally, we explicitly model the pol-
icy uncertainty as the relative priority the regulator puts on economic activity with respect
to environment concerns and we assume that it follows a mean preserving spread process.
The results of previous literature carry over to our enlarged framework as far as irreversible
investment is concerned. Namely, we ﬁnd uncertainty always reduces investment levels.
Regarding reversible investment taken in isolation, our results diﬀer with respect to pre-
vious literature. Speciﬁcally, allowing ﬁrms to change their production ex post provides
them with an additional instrument to cope with uncertainty (output eﬀect), which mit-
igates to some extent the positive eﬀect of uncertainty in reversible investment. Finally,
in a complete setup, we show that introducing the additional possibility of irreversible
investment partially eliminates the potential positive eﬀect of policy uncertainty on re-
versible technology. The negative eﬀect of uncertainty on irreversible investment carries
over to the proﬁtability of the reversible one, so that for higher levels of uncertainty this
eﬀect becomes negative.
To sum up, we ﬁnd that only when policy makers are concerned primarily with economic
expansion, relative to environmental issues, a small level of uncertainty might increase
reversible investment, by making it a proﬁtable opportunity. This situation might take
place in developing countries, where often growth concerns relegate environmental issues
to the background. On the contrary, in the case of the European Union, where we observe
a higher environmental awareness, with clear long run green policy goals, policy uncer-
tainty most likely has a negative eﬀect on all investment in low-carbon technology. In
this case the introduction of commitment mechanisms that reduce long-term uncertainty
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would help to create the right incentives to reach the CO2 reduction target of the policy.
These could consist, for example, of the setting of a long-term limited range for the cap,
which would be enforceable by law, thereby binding future governments. These mecha-
nisms should however guarantee the minimum ﬂexibility required to adjust to unforeseen
changes of the technological process or to stabilize economic shocks.
Our analysis abstracts from features of permit markets that might have considerable im-
pact on our analysis. The ﬁrst is that we assumes a constant demand and prices for
ﬁrms’ output. As input prices increases and demand is constant, prices are likely to
adjust thereby increasing the ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. If this is the case the eﬀect of policy
uncertainty might be substantially buﬀered. The second is that we do not consider the
possibility of permit banking introduced in the third phase of the EU ETS. Banking en-
dows ﬁrms with another instrument to hedge against uncertainty, thereby constituting an
important substitute to both reversible and irreversible investment. An interesting exten-
sion to our model would be to analyze the ﬁnal eﬀect in terms of both investment and
emissions.
Appendix
1.A The EU ETS and Policy Uncertainty
Launched in 2005, the EU ETS is a market based approach that relies on the companies’
cost diﬀerential of reducing emissions. The current scheme involves two sectors: power
companies and carbon-intensive industries. Industries covered include factories producing
cement, lime, glass, brick, pulp and paper, oil reﬁneries, coke ovens, iron and steel.33 Each
of these installations receives annually an allocation of permits which corresponds to the
total amount of CO2 it is entitled to emit during the production processes. At the end of a
speciﬁed trading round, each participant is required to hold permits representing its total
emissions for the period.34 Companies that exceed their quotas are allowed to buy unused
permits from those that have excess supply, as a result of investment in abatement or of
reduction in their production level. These permits are called European Union Allowances
33Petro-chemical and aviation will be part of the scheme in 2012-2013.
34From the second phase of the scheme, ﬁrms are allowed to bank and borrow their permits among
diﬀerent periods and phases of the scheme, namely to smooth the usage of their permits inter-temporally.
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(EUA) and are traded in a speciﬁc platform, one EUA corresponding to the right to emit
one ton of CO2. Participants who do not meet this requirement are subject to ﬁnancial
penalties.
Until 2008 the authority opted for a grandfathering type of allocation, namely based on
historical emissions levels, but from 2013 the scheme will move towards an allocation rule
based on benchmarking and auctioning.35 The total amount of the allocated permits
constitutes the cap. Both the cap and the allocation are set by the regulatory authority.
Until 2008 the allocation decision was made by national authorities through the National
Allocation Plans, while from 2013 this decision has been centralized at the European level.
The authority decides on the level of the cap period by period but considering long run
targets. These periods are called phases and they diﬀer in length. Fig.1.8-1.10 depict
for each of these phases the information available to ﬁrms regarding the future aggregate
cap. Directive 2003/87/EC set the goal of achieving an 8% reduction in emissions of
Figure 1.8: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2003. Source: European Commission.
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greenhouse gases by 2008 to 2012 compared to 1990 levels, and established a long-run goal
of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by approximately 70% compared to 1990 levels.
35This additional feature should not change our results. In fact, assuming that the auction revenues are
redistributed by the authority as lump sum to the same ﬁrms, the regulator’s objective function is not
aﬀected.
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The only cap set precisely was that of the ﬁrst phase, 2005-2007 (Fig.1.8). This means
that each regulated ﬁrm had to plan its long term investment, which has a payback period
estimated in around 15 years, without knowing the aggregate cap level, and therefore its
allocation of allowances, from 2008 onwards, but assuming a tighter cap in the future given
the long term reduction goal (-70% compared to 1990 levels). In 2007, the cap for the
Figure 1.9: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2007. Source: European Commission.










	








	 
           


 !"#$%&
 !"#$%&&
#%'!! !"#$%&&
(!)*+"
period 2008-2012 was set to 2177MtCO2, thereby correcting the previously announced one
(dashed line in Fig.1.9). As reported by the EU Press Release IP/07/1614 of 26/10/2007,
the European Commission also made a unilateral commitment that Europe would cut its
emissions by at least 20% of 1990 levels by 2020, to be implemented ”through a package
of binding legislation”. Although this implies a higher commitment of authorities towards
lower emissions, also in this phase economic agents were uncertain about the cap level
after 2012. Moreover the unexpected revision dictated by the over-allocation from the
ﬁrst phase increased even more the perceived volatility of the future cap level.
Finally, as shown in Fig.1.10, for the period 2013-2020, the cap corresponds to a
trajectory. Speciﬁcally, it ”will decrease each year by 1.47% of the average annual total
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Figure 1.10: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2010. Source: European Commission.
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quantity of allowances issued by the Member States in 2008-2012”, according to directive
2010/634/EU, starting with a cap of 2039MtCO2. However, after 2020, the cap level is
still unclear: it is stated that ”this annual reduction will continue beyond 2020 but may be
subject to revision not later than 2025”. As underlined above, given the long term nature
of low-carbon investments (around 15 years), this uncertainty over the policy instrument,
the cap, may aﬀect aggregate investment.
1.B Gas transition in the European power sector
For the choice of reversible investment we used the possibility for electricity generating
ﬁrms to produce with gas or coal, according to which is more proﬁtable. The following
table reports the percentage of coal and gas used in the production mix of the power sector
in diﬀerent European countries in 1990 and 2010, as evidence of the relevance of gas as
a production output. Coal is clearly substituted out, mostly by gas, in all the countries
considered. This is not only a feature of the European Union, but a worldwide trend of
employing gas in the electricity generation process.
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Table 1.2: Coal and gas in the energy mix. Source: Enerdata and IEA.
Percentage of coal and gas in the energy mix (1990-2010)
Coal Gas
1990 2010 1990 2010
Germany 58% 44% 7% 13%
Italy 17% 14% 19% 53%
Spain 40% 11% 1% 32%
United Kingdom 65% 28% 1% 46%
1.C Calibration
We present the parameter restrictions used for the interpretation of the results. As previ-
ously pointed out, this calibration exercise is dictated by the complexity of the analytical
solutions.
Given the richness of information provided by the UK Government Department of Energy
and Climate Change, we take the British market as a benchmark for the calibration of the
parameters that are country dependent.
Productivity. We calibrate three diﬀerent productivity parameters: one for the power
sector when the plant is run by using coal (α1,e), one when the plant produces by using
gas(α1,G), and, ﬁnally, one for the industries sector which produces always by using coal
(α2). We consider the productivity of gas (output per 1000 cubic meters), adjusted for the
thermodynamic eﬃciency of an average gas power plants, to be equal to 11 MWh/dam3
(caloriﬁc value=40). For the coal, the adjusted productivity is set at 6.68 MWh/tonne.
As mentioned in Section III, these parameters include also the price of the output. This
means, for instance, that to calibrate (α1,e) we have to multiply the productivity of a
power plant using coal by the retail price of electricity. For the ﬁrst two parameters,
(α1,e) and (α1,G), we use the Energy Prices and Taxes Statistics of the International En-
ergy Agency, and take the annual average UK retail prices excluding taxes (in pounds
per kWh) as a proxy for the price of electricity. Speciﬁcally, the annual average of UK
end-of-use electricity price from 2006 to 2010 is 137 Euro per MWh (applying the current
exchange rate). For the industrial sector we choose four industries regulated by the ETS :
Steel, Cement, Pulp and Aluminium,36 and we construct an industrial sector productivity
36The latter will be included in the scheme in 2013.
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index. Therefore (α2)is the deﬁned as
∑4
j=1 pjνj , where j is the industry index, pj is the
output price of industry j, and νj is the output per ton of coal ratio for industry j. Indus-
try data is taken from sector associations while average output prices are collected from
London Metal Exchange. The particular values follow. Cement UK industry: ν = 0.78,
p = 70 Euro/t; Steel UK industry: ν = 1, p = 400 Euro/t; Aluminium UK industry:
ν = 0.7, p = 1800 Euro/t; Pulp EU industry:37 ν = 0.83, p = 480 Euro/t. Summing up,
the three adjusted productivity parameters are the following: α1,e = 339.9, α2 = 528.25,
α1,G = 509.6, and they are consistent with the observed fact that gas is more productive
than coal.
Inputs Cost. As mentioned in previous sections, C(e) and C(G) are the operating costs
of the fuels and we assume them to be convex in order to comprise not only the price
of fuels, but also the storage and opportunity costs. As a proxy for c and g, we use UK
government statistics on average prices of fuels purchased by the major UK power pro-
ducers:38 c = 62 Euro/t and g = 185.9 Euro/dm3.
Emission Factor. λ is the proportion of CO2 emitted by one unit of gas, as compared to
that of one unit of coal. Given that the amount of CO2 generated by one unit coal equals
2.86 ton and the CO2 emitted by gas is 0.0019 t/m
3, after the required measurement
transformations, we get that the relative emission produced by one cubic meter of gas is
0.8.
Investment Costs for Irreversible Investment. k2 and k1 represent the cost that
industries incur in to improve their energy eﬃciency and that power companies have to
pay to invest in renewables, respectively. As evidence suggests that these values diﬀer
considerably depending on the technology, we do not assign any value to these parameters
and we let them be restricted only by the conditions indicated in the Section IV.
Finally note that, given the stylized three period nature of the model, most of the model
parameters do not have a direct correspondent to reality, where the time horizon is more
extend and involves several repetitions of investment and production decisions.
37Due to absence of pulp production in the UK we use EU data as the ETS is a European Market.
38Given that the average annual prices of coal purchased by the manufacturing industry in the UK is
very close to the cost of coal paid by power producers, we use the same average for both sectors.
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Pork Barrel as a Signaling Tool: The
Case of US Environmental Policy
2.1 Introduction
It is a well documented fact that economic decisions are distorted by electoral competi-
tion, across a variety of issues.1 One particular tool used by politicians in order to obtain
political advantage is the assignment of beneﬁts to particular groups, geographically or
otherwise determined. These beneﬁts, typically called pork barrel,2 might take the form
of increases in highly visible local public goods, approval of particular projects, or even
transfers from the central government. Pork barrel is often used in legislatures as a “cur-
rency” to build coalitions that allow to pass general interest legislation, but it is also
an instrument in electoral competition used by incumbent politicians to gain the voters’
support. And while in the former case it might generate beneﬁts, by greasing the wheels
of the legislative process (Evans, 2004), election-motivated changes in the composition of
spending are widely accepted as constituting eﬃciency losses: by distributing pork when
the budget is limited and ﬁxed, politicians deviate from the welfare maximizing level of
collective goods (Hicken and Simmons, 2008). Assessing the mechanism that is behind
them, and the incentives to perform these policies is, therefore, of signiﬁcant importance.
This chapter aims at providing an insight into the mechanism generating election-year
pork barrel policies, particularly regarding expenditures in goods or services likely to
have strong support from some citizens, by deriving theoretical implications from a sim-
ple model and testing them empirically. It evaluates whether signaling is a driving force
behind pre-electoral pork, where signaling refers to the conveying of preferences of the
politician, true or not, through enacted policies. The idea is that politicians cannot com-
mit to implement policies that they do not favor, and in the absence of this commitment,
1See Brender and Drazen (2005) for an empirical study on a large panel of countries.
2The expression is said to have originated in the pre civil war United States, when barrels of salt pork
were given to slaves, who were required to compete for a share of it.
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they use current policies to signal preferences, which are persistent over time, to the elec-
torate. The implications of the model are tested on United States (US) environmental
policy. Environmental policy is particularly prone to political pressure. The fact that
it triggers strong opinions from the electorate renders it particularly suitable to test the
current model.
I develop a two-period model of electoral competition, based on the framework of Pers-
son and Tabellini (1999), where an incumbent divides a ﬁxed budget between a national
public good and expenditures on three “particularistic” issues - one of which is environ-
mental spending - that assign extra beneﬁts for those voters with strong preferences for
them. Here, however, the politician is both policy and oﬃce motivated, and there is no
commitment. Politicians are citizens who have themselves preferences for diﬀerent types
of expenditures. Thus the incumbent in the ﬁrst period chooses her policy so as to max-
imize her utility, which depends on her policy preferences and the probability of being
re-elected. Voters are rational, forward-looking, and informed about economic policies
but imperfectly informed about the preferences of the politician. So they use current
policies to infer them through bayesian updating: an increase in expenditures might mean
the politician is performing pork barrel or that she has a genuine preference for them.
The concept of probabilistic voting is used to solve the model. Finally, all agents are also
ideologically biased.
The model generates conditions under which pork barrel arises as a political equilibrium
for signaling purposes, that it, when pork is credible or eﬀective in changing imperfectly
informed voters’ beliefs. I ﬁnd that this occurs less when the politician’s discount factor is
higher than a threshold, and when she cannot be re-elected (she is a “lame duck”). These
ﬁndings are consistent with previous results of downsian models. The former occurs be-
cause a high discount rate decreases the incentives of an incumbent to seek re-election
through pork. So for example establishing terms limits should decrease the amount of
pork, even if these are not binding in a given election. The latter is straightforward to un-
derstand - in the absence of re-election incentives, the politician does not have incentives
to signal. Finally, I ﬁnd that pork spending with signaling purposes occurs less towards
the most ideologically dispersed group. This happens because in practice pork shifts the
identity of the swing voter in the group receiving it towards the ideology of the incumbent.
So by targeting voters more densely concentrated ideologically the incumbent is able to
shift more votes with the same amount of expenditures. Intuitively, it means that it is
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easier to sway more homogeneous groups.
I test these predictions using a panel of state level data for the US from 1970 to 2000,
including public expenditure and revenue, demographic characteristics, electoral data, and
voters’ preferences for the environment. To measure the latter I create an indicator, based
on surveys, that measures the ideological dispersion of environmentally biased voters in
each state. To measure pork barrel I focus on systematic increases in environmental ex-
penditures in election years, relative to total expenditures, as well as deviations on these
years relative to the mean of all the other years of the mandate of the same politician.
US state policy is a particularly relevant laboratory to test the predictions of the model,
since environmental expenditures are decided at the state level with a large degree of
independence and strong policy preferences of voters are known to politicians before elec-
tions. Additionally, the large amount of years available and detail of the data facilitate
the identiﬁcation strategy.
The empirical results indicate that environmental expenditures in the US are in fact sub-
ject to pre-electoral pork barrel with signaling purposes. Particularly, I ﬁnd that election-
year increases in environmental expenditures occur more in states where term limit legis-
lation is in place, implying a higher discount factor for incumbents, when the politician
is not up for re-elections, and that they do not happen systematically for states where
environmentally biased voters are more ideologically dispersed. The latter result more
directly corroborates the signaling framework, as it is predicted by the present model but
is not explained by other pre-electoral pork generating theories. These distortions remain
visible and even stronger when restricting the analysis to elections less likely to be decided
on the basis of ideology and close elections.
The analysis thus provides an insight into the mechanism behind distortionary policies
with electoral incentives, particularly regarding policies generating strong support from
some groups of the population, and contributes to the literature on the political economy
of environmental policy in countries with elected governments. These insights have impli-
cations for theoretical studies of electoral distortions, interest group power, and governance
discussions around mechanisms to prevent ineﬃcient behavior. These are discussed in the
conclusion.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy revises
some of the related literature. Section 2.3 describes and solves the theoretical model, and
sets out the testable hypothesis it generates. Section 2.4 describes the empirical strategy
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and Section 2.5 its results. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the chapter and puts forward
implications of the analysis.
2.2 Literature
Large part of the existing theory on the use of pork distribution as an instrument to seek
voter support focuses on models with full commitment by downsian politicians: following
Downs (1957), candidates are purely oﬃce-motivated, and make binding promises as to
the amount of pork spending they oﬀer to voters. Some examples are Lizzeri and Persico
(2001) and Persson and Tabellini (1999). However, politicians as citizens are likely to
care not only about being in oﬃce but also about the policies performed, such that full
commitment cannot be guaranteed. This idea is explored in citizen-candidate models (Os-
borne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997), where politicians are citizens who
decide to apply for oﬃce in order to implement their preferred policy. A model of pork
spending where politicians have policy preferences is developed by Bouton et al. (2013),
who use a retrospective probabilistic voting model to determine when politicians cater to
a secondary issue, gun control, that a minority cares about, or a primary issue. However, a
large body of research has found that prospective evaluations are important determinants
of voting choices, in some cases more so than retrospective ones.3
Pre-electoral distortions are conciliated with forward-looking voters by political business
cycle models, where incumbent politicians signal their competence by increasing expen-
ditures or decreasing taxes, at the expense of the lately observed deﬁcit.4 The main idea
is that, because information is costly, rational forward looking voters infer incumbent’s
quality by the amount of expenditure they can provide, for a given level of taxes, and
vote for the ones perceived as competent. However, these models imply voters do not ob-
serve some economic variable prior to elections, which is less likely to happen in developed
democracies where more and better information is available.5 In established democracies
distortions are more likely to arise from incomplete information regarding preferences of
the incumbent. If these persist over time, current policy can be used as an indicator of
3See for example Lewis-Beck, 1990, Lockerbie, 1992, and Erikson et al. (2000).
4The seminal work by Nordhaus (1975) was later extended to include rational expectations by Rogoﬀ
and Sibert (1988) and Rogoﬀ (1990).
5Brender and Drazen (2005) ﬁnd that political budget cycles tend to disappear in established democ-
racies, as voters become better at collecting and reporting relevant data.
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future actions. This idea is used to evaluate how a politician may signal preference for
expenditures that beneﬁt the population instead of herself, by Drazen and Eslava (2010),
with an empirical application evaluating the increase of highly visible expenditures in
election years in Colombian municipalities. Redistribution between issues that population
groups value diﬀerently, however, may also arise for signaling purposes. Preferences for
diﬀerent groups or issues has been studied in two papers. Focusing on preferences for dif-
ferent groups, Morelli and Van Weelden (2013) develop a theoretical framework to study
politicians’ incentives to focus eﬀort on issues where they can best signal their preferences
to voters, and the eﬀects of increased transparency on this allocation. Drazen and Eslava
(2012), in turn, study programmatic targeting of diﬀerent groups of population, ﬁnding
that politicians target with expenditures larger groups and those with more swing vot-
ers, and do not often target to mobilize groups into going to vote. However, none of the
previous papers oﬀers an empirical analysis of the validity of the framework of signaling
preferences for issues that given groups value but others do not.
Finally, recent literature has focused on many aspects of the political economy of environ-
mental policy. In particular, environmental expenditures in the US have been the subject
of empirical analysis of political economy theories, mostly related to lobbying, but also to
a lesser extent to electoral incentives. An example of the latter is List and Sturm (2006),
who test how a secondary policy issue is aﬀected by electoral incentives. In their model
voters do not observe an economic shock happening prior to the election, as well as the
politician’s type. In another study, Fredriksson et al. (2011) use regression discontinuity
approaches to test whether elected politicians are mostly oﬃce or policy motivated. Both
analyses address diﬀerences between terms where incumbents can be re-elected and those
she cannot (she is a “lame duck”). Instead I focus on election year behavior, giving rise
to electoral cycles, while testing hypothesis from a diﬀerent underlying behavior.
2.3 The Model
The model in this section ﬁts the citizen-candidate framework (Osborne and Slivinski,
1996, and Besley and Coate, 1997), in the sense of having politicians who, as citizens,
have intrinsic policy preferences. Thus, they cannot credibly commit to a given platform.
However, in this model, the politicians’ preferences are not observed by the voters prior
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to elections. I will abstract from the entry decision, by assuming there is only one chal-
lenger, selected randomly from the pool of citizens, conditional on ideology. The model
also borrows from the Downsian framework (Downs, 1957), in the sense that candidates, in
addition to having policy preferences, are oﬃce-motivated, which means that they obtain
an additional payoﬀ solely for being in power. Additionally, the model incorporates the
possibility of using changes in current policies as a signaling tool for incumbents’ unob-
served characteristics, set out in the models of Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) and Rogoﬀ (1990).
The distribution of the agents’ policy and ideological preferences is the one in Persson and
Tabellini (1999).
2.3.1 Setup
The economy is composed by a continuum of citizens, divided into three groups of equal
size, i = 1, 2, 3, that diﬀer in two dimensions: their preferences regarding ﬁscal policies
(how the budget is divided) and their ideology. There are two time periods, t = 1, 2, with
a single election taking place at the end of period 1, between an incumbent politician (I)
and a randomly selected challenger (C). The incumbent in each period decides on what
will be called the ﬁscal policy: how to allocate a ﬁxed budget, T , between expenditures
targeted at one of three particular issues, gi,t, and a bundle of national level expenditures,
which beneﬁt all the population equally, Gt. The targeted expenditures are expenditures
on issues for which voters care in diﬀerent ways - namely, voters who have a preference
for certain issues derive utility from those expenditures, while the others do not. A good
example is spending in environmental protection, for which some citizens with environ-
mental concerns have strong preferences and so they value them, while others do not. In
particular, I assume voters in each of the three groups derive utility from only one of the
three expenditures: voters in group i derive utility from gi,t. Politicians, as citizens, also
have policy preferences - i.e., they derive utility from one of the targeted expenditures.
Policy preferences are not known to voters, but only the distribution of preferences of the
population. Politicians also derive utility simply from being in oﬃce, from extracted rents
or prestige.
The agents in the model also have ideological preferences, which are known and separate
from their policy preferences, and include for example their position on issues like abortion
or drug policy. The model further assumes the incumbent belongs to a party that is on
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one side of the ideological spectrum and the challenger to the one on the opposite. The-
oretical results for downsian models with slightly policy-motivated politicians and some
uncertainty on voters’ behavior show that parties locate symmetrically around the median
voter.6 Finally, ideological preferences include a shock to general popularity shock: the in-
cumbent may be more or less popular before the election, because of some personal factor.7
The realization of the popularity shock is not known to the incumbent prior to the election.
The timing of the model is the following: in period zero nature chooses the policy pref-
erences and ideology of the incumbent, challenger and voters, and during the ﬁrst period,
the incumbent chooses the allocation of the budget, which voters observe. At the end of
period one, the challenger is chosen from the population, the popularity shock is realized,
and the citizens vote. In the second period the candidate who is elected, according to the
majoritarian voting rule, chooses the policy to be implemented.
The budget constraint
In a given period t the incumbent politician faces the following budget constraint:
3∑
i
gi,t +Gt = T (2.1)
where T is a ﬁxed value, equal for each period, Gt is continuous, with 0 < Gt < T ,
and expenditures targeted at each issue gi,t are for simplicity assumed to be of a discrete
nature: gi = {1, 0}. They each have an equal cost, with the cost of spending on all
adding to T , such that spending on one of them would take up one third of the budget.8
The incumbent’s ﬁscal policy can then be summarized as a vector qIt =
[
{gi,t}i=1,2,3 , Gt
]
,
where the superscript I indicates that it is the incumbent’s choice. As is standard in
the pork barrel literature,9 Gt is by assumption the eﬃcient choice, which beneﬁts all
groups equally. However, gi,t can be targeted to a speciﬁc group, thereby increasing the
6See, for example, Calvert (1985).
7Voters may be more inclined to vote for a politician if she is perceived as respectful or competent in
the latest public appearances or news reports.
8The case with continuous choices would require additional assumptions on the shape of utility functions,
but for given characteristics the main results would not change qualitatively.
9See, for example, Lizzeri and Persico (2001).
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probability of getting the votes of the particular group more sharply. So the incumbent
faces a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and targetability.
Voters
Voters are divided into three groups, i = 1, 2, 3, each with a continuum of citizens with
unit mass, where preferences over ﬁscal policy are identical for all members of each group.
The one-period utility, derived from ﬁscal policy, of a voter from group i in time t if policy
qIt is being performed can be written as:
Ui,t(q
I
t ) = μigi,t + v(Gt), gi = {1, 0} (2.2)
where μi is a markup measuring the increase in utility from having expenditures in
the preferred issue made, gi,t is equal to 1 if these expenditures are made and 0 otherwise,
and v(.) is monotonically increasing and concave. The fact that μi varies across groups
accounts for the intensity of preferences, as some issues elicit stronger positions.
In addition to deriving utility from ﬁscal policy, voters have preferences over other aspects
of political decision making (“ideological preferences”), which include individual ideologies
and the general popularity of the incumbent. The ideological distribution used here is the
one in Persson and Tabellini (1999), but adapted to the signaling structure of the present
model. A voter j in group i has an ideological preference for the challenger, which can be
positive of negative, given by (δ+σj). Here, δ is the general popularity of the challenger,10
due to some personal characteristic or charisma, and is a random variable with uniform
distribution with expected value zero and density z. That is, δ ∼ U [− 12z , 12z ]. The shock
is realized at the end of the ﬁrst period, before the election, so the incumbent decides on
ﬁrst period policies under uncertainty. In turn, σj is the individual ideology of voter j
of group i, which is distributed according to a uniform distribution with expected value
σi (group i’s speciﬁc mean), and density di. That is, σj ∼ U [− 1
2di
+ σi, 1
2di
+ σi
]
. The
distributions are common knowledge, but only the agent j observes her own parameter σj .
As in Persson and Tabellini (1999), I assume σ1 < σ2 < σ3, and σ2 = 0. That is, group
2 is the one with more ideologically neutral, or swing, voters. Additionally, as they do, I
assume group 2 is the one with the highest density (d2 > d1, d3), that d1 > d3 and that
σ1d1 + σ3d3 = 0. The assumptions on the ordering of densities are made without loss of
10The general popularity of the incumbent is the symmetrical opposite of the challenger’s popularity.
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generality: the results do not change qualitatively for any ordering.11 The last assumption,
along with σ2 = 0, is made for simplicity, and means that the number of voters to the
right and the left of the ideologically neutral ones is the same. If this assumption was to
be relaxed, the ordering of densities would have an eﬀect, as one of the politicians would
have an ideological advantage (which would be larger the higher the density of the group
with the same ideology). However, this analysis is beyond the scope of the chapter. The
ideological distribution of voters can be summarized in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Ideological distribution of voters



	
	
 	

 =σ σσ
σ
The ﬁgure shows that all the groups have ideologically neutral voters. However, ac-
cording to the density distribution, group 2 has the most, followed by 1, and ﬁnally, group
3 has the least swing voters. The main idea is that, if δ = 0, an ideologically neutral
voter will cast her vote solely on basis of her ﬁscal utility (i.e., vote for the incumbent if
E
[
Ui(q
I
t+1)
]
> E
[
Ui(q
C
t+1)
]
).
11As will be clear from the equilibrium conditions, changing the ordering of densities will only aﬀect the
type of incumbent that plays a given strategy, but not the qualitative results.
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The Politicians
The politician’s utility in period t is analogous to that of a citizen, but includes the payoﬀ
from being in oﬃce, γ. For an incumbent with a preference for issue k, k = 1, 2, 3:12
wIk,t(q
I
t ) = U
I
k,t(q
I
t ) + γ = μkgk + v(G) + γ, gk = {1, 0} (2.3)
where wIk,t(q
I
t ) is the total utility of an incumbent in period t, and U
I
k,t(q
I
t ) stands again
for the utility derived solely from ﬁscal policy qIt . The incumbent chooses current policy
in order to maximize her two-period utility, W Ik , which depends on the utility in equation
(2.3) and the probability of being re-elected, π, which is deﬁned later:
W Ik = U
I
k,t(q
I
t ) + γ + β
[
π
(
U Ik,t(q
I
t ) + γ
)
+ (1− π) (E [U(qCt+1)])] (2.4)
where β is the discount factor, and the superscripts I and C indicate choices of the
incumbent and the challenger, respectively. Ideologically, the incumbent is located to the
left of σ2 and the challenger to the right. They are further located symmetrically around
the σ2 such that this is the location of the ideologically neutral voter.13
Voting Behavior and Beliefs
Voters make their decision according to their policy and ideological preferences. They
are forward-looking and wish to maximize their second period expected utility. So, in
choosing the best candidate, they compute their expected utility in t + 1 under each of
them, and vote for the one that gives them the highest, conditional on the ideological bias
not oﬀsetting this. Voter j in group i will, therefore, vote for the incumbent if:
E
[
Ui,t+1(q
I
t+1)
]
> E
[
Ui,t+1(q
C
t+1)
]
+
(
δ + σj
)
(2.5)
Since policy is multi-dimensional, the notion of probabilistic voting will be used to ﬁnd
an equilibrium. The vote share of the incumbent in group i, SI,i, is thus given by:
SI,i = di
[
E
[
Ui,t+1(q
I)
]− E [Ui,t+1(qC)]− δ − σi]+ 1
2
(2.6)
12Throughout the analysis k will be used to indicate the politician’s type and i the citizens’ type, where
k, i = 1, 2, 3.
13The same assumption is made in Persson and Tabellini (1999).
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The probability of winning the election diﬀers depending on the electoral rule in place.
Since the empirical analysis is performed for US gubernatorial elections, I focus on a
majoritarian system with a single electoral district.14 Under a single-district system, a
politician in each state wins the election if she obtains more than 12 of the total votes of
the population in that state. Thus the incumbent’s probability of winning in given by:
πIqI = Pr
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
3∑
i=1
SI,i
3
≥ 1
2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (2.7)
By equation (2.7), the assumption on the distribution of δ, and the assumptions on
the distribution of voters’ preferences,15 this probability is given by:
πIqI =
z
3∑
i=1
di
[
3∑
i=1
diεi
]
+
1
2
(2.8)
where εi = E
[
Ui,t+1(q
I)
]− E [Ui,t+1(qC)]
Voters have prior probability λPi that a politician P = I, C is of type i, for each
i = 1, 2, 3. After observing ﬁrst period policies, voters in each group update their beliefs
on the incumbent’s type through Bayesian updating, while keeping their prior on the chal-
lenger. Hence, the incumbent has a scope to use current policy to change voter’s beliefs
regarding her preferences, that is, to signal a type, which might not be the true one. If
the politician’s signaling changes the voters’ prior beliefs, we say it was eﬀective.
2.3.2 Full Information Benchmark
The model is solved by backwards induction. Since there are no more elections after the
last period, in t + 1 the politician of type k = 1, 2, 3 in power simply chooses the policy
14The analysis is easily extendable to a multiple district framework, which national level elections would
ﬁt. The results of this case are available upon request, and show that pork barrel with signaling purposes
occurs even more frequently under a multiple district electoral rule.
15In particular, that σ2 = 0 and σ1d1 + σ3d3 = 0
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that maximizes her utility:
max
gi,t+1
μkgk,t+1 + v(Gt+1) + γ (2.9)
s.t.
3∑
i
gi,t+1 +Gt+1 = T
for i = 1, 2, 3. Thus the politician will never decide to spend on other issues apart
from her preferred one. Assuming v (T ) − v (T − gk,t+1) < μkgk,t+1), ∀k, the politician
will spend on gk,t+1, instead of using all the budget for the national level good. Hence,
qPt+1 = {G∗t+1, gk,t+1}, where G∗t+1 = T − gk,t+1.
With full information on the voters’ side the preferences of the politician are known, so
there is no scope for signaling. Thus also in the ﬁrst period the incumbent chooses the ﬁscal
policy that maximizes her period utility, qIt = {G∗t , gk,t}, where again G∗t = T − gk,t and
k = {1, 2, 3} is the incumbent’s preferred issue. The only uncertainty is on the incumbent’s
side, regarding the realization of the popularity shock δ.
In this setting there are two categories of equilibria, depending on whether the politicians
are of the same type or of diﬀerent types. If the incumbent and the challenger have a
preference for the same issue, then the probability of winning is equal to 12 , independent
of group densities or the politicians’ popularity. To see this note that Ui,t+1(q
I
t+1) =
Ui,t+1(q
C
t+1), ∀i = {1, 2, 3}, that is, εi = 0, so the incumbent’s vote share in each of the
three groups simpliﬁes to SI,i = di
[−δ − σi]+ 12 .
This means that πI
qI
= z3∑
i=1
di
[
3∑
i=1
diεi
]
+ 12 =
1
2 .
If the politicians are of diﬀerent types, with the incumbent of type k and the challenger j,
the utility diﬀerential of having the incumbent in power for voters in group k is positive
and given by εk = Uk,t+1(q
I
t+1) = Uk,t+1(q
C
t+1) > 0. Similarly, ε
j < 0 and for the third
group it is once again zero. The incumbent’s winning probability is thus given by πI
qI
=
z
3∑
i=1
di
[
dkεk + djεj
]
+ 12 =
1
2 . Whether the expression in brackets is positive or negative
depends on the densities of the two groups. Since d2 > d1 > d3 a politician of type
two will win over the other two types, and type one will win over type three. With
full information the policy performed is always qPt = {G∗t , gk,t}, where k stands for the
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politician’s preference.
2.3.3 Asymmetric Information
Equilibrium Deﬁnition
In the asymmetric information case, the equilibrium concert used will be that of a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
Deﬁnition 1 Equilibrium
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in this setting satisﬁes the following conditions:
(a) In the ﬁrst period, the incumbent decides on the ﬁscal policy qIt that maximizes her two
period utility given by (2.4), subject to the belief system given by the priors and bayesian
updating, her expected popularity, and the optimal strategies of voters;
(b)At the voting stage, voters in each group i maximize their expected utility, subject to
the belief system and the incumbent’s ﬁrst period decisions, and therefore vote for the
incumbent if E
[
Ui(q
I
t+1)
]
> E
[
Ui(q
C
t+1)
]
+
(
δ + σj
)
;
(c) Beliefs are consistent on the equilibrium path.
For simplicity, I restrict the analysis to PBE in pure strategies. With the distributional
assumptions made, three particular cases arise, depending on which issue the incumbent
has a preference for:
1. The incumbent has a preference for the issue favored by the most ideologically dis-
persed group (group 3)
2. The incumbent has a preference for the issue favored by the group with the most
swing voters (group 2), that it, with higher density around the ideological mean
3. The incumbent has a preference for the group with intermediate ideological density
(group 1)
The incentives for the incumbent to choose diﬀerent policies vary between the cases.
Due to the discrete nature of the expenditures targeted at each of the three issues, the
incumbent’s actions are also of a discrete nature: she can spend on all, three, one, or none
of the issues. At this point it is convenient to deﬁne the pork barrel strategy.
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Deﬁnition 2 Pork Barrel
Performing Pork Barrel in the current setting consists of spending, for re-election purposes,
on more issues than what maximizes the politician’s period utility.
More speciﬁcally, as set out in Section 2.3.2, the politician’s period utility is maxi-
mized by qPt = {G∗t , gk,t}. So the incumbent’s non pork barrel (PB) strategy in period t
is deﬁned as qPBt = {G∗t , gk,t}, where G∗t = T − gk,t and the superscript I was suppressed
since only the incumbent chooses policy in period t. The incumbent’s pork barrel (PB)
strategy is in turn given by qPBt = {GPBt , gk,t, gi,t}, ∀i = k, where GPBt = T −gi,t−gk,t, i =
k, i, k = {1, 2, 3}. Thus, we say that an incumbent is performing pork barrel if she spends
on her favorite issue k and one of the other two, instead of maximizing her period utility.
When spending on two issues instead of one, the politician is signaling that she might
have a preference for any of these two issues.
It is straightforward to see that a politician never chooses to spend on two issues that she
does not have a preference for. I further assume she never spends on all three issues, thus
choosing Gt = 0, nor on none of the issues, thus choosing Gt = T . Both these strategies
would not signal any type, but the former would give a lower utility than the latter as
long as μgk,t < v(Gt = T ). The latter is also always inferior to the PB strategy as long
as v(Gt = T ) − v(G∗t ) < μgk,t. So as long as v(Gt) is suﬃciently concave the politician’s
optimal choice is between qPBt and q
PB
t .
Political Economic Equilibrium
When deciding between the two policies, qPBt and q
PB
t , the incumbent of type k = {1, 2, 3}
compares her expected utility under each, that is E
[
WU I(qPBt )
]
> E
[
WU I(qPBt )
]
which
substituting in the previous equations is:
v(GPBt )− v(G∗t ) + β
[(
πI
qPBt
− πI
qPBt
)([
1− λk
]
μkgk,t+1 + γ
)]
> 0 (2.10)
Here v(GPBt )− v(G∗t ) is the loss in utility in period t from performing the pork strat-
egy, and the expression is square brackets is the diﬀerence in the expected utility in t+1,
relative to the non pork strategy. πI
qPBt
− πI
qPBt
is the diﬀerence in re-election probability
between performing and not performing the pork barrel strategy, and
[
1− λk]μkgk,t+1+γ
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the gain in utility from being in oﬃce in t+1 relative to not being in oﬃce. By assumption
v(GPBt )−v(G∗t ) < 0. Whether or not there is an equilibrium where the politician performs
pork thus depends on whether πI
qPBt
− πI
qPBt
can be positive.
The probability of re-election is aﬀected by the incumbent’s actions if they alter the
voters’ beliefs. The incumbent may target other issues apart from her favorite in order
to aﬀect the voters’ expected utility diﬀerential, εit+1, i = {1, 2, 3}. In particular, if she
signals a type other than her own (−k) and this signaling is eﬀective, ε−kt+1 increases. This
is because then voters attribute a higher probability to the incumbent being of type −k
than if she had not signaled.
If she performs qPBt her type is revealed. This is because Pr(q
PB
t |I = k) = 0, that is, the
incumbent will never spend only on gk,t+1 if she is of another type. So voters update their
beliefs that the incumbent is of type k according to:
Pr
(
I = k|qI,PBt
)
= 1 (2.11)
which means that for voters in group k the expected utility diﬀerential becomes pos-
itive, that is, εk = (1 − λk)μkgk,t+1, while the opposite is true for the other two groups,
where ε−k = −λ−kμ−kg−k,t+1. The incumbent’s probability of re-election is therefore
given by the following expression.
πI
qI,PBt
=
z
3∑
i=1
di
gt+1
(
dkμk [(1− λk)] +
2∑
d−kμ−k [−λ−k]
)
+
1
2
(2.12)
where gi,t+1 = gt+1, ∀i = {1, 2, 3}.
Alternatively, the incumbent may choose qPBt = {GPBt , gk,t, gi,t}, ∀i = k. In this case, she
will spend on her favorite issue, k, and in one of the other two i = k. In choosing which
of the other issues to target she compares the gain in the probability of winning in each of
the other two groups. This is because when voters see that the incumbent spent on their
favorite issue they will update their belief that the politician is of their type. However,
relative to the PB strategy, the incumbent loses votes in her own group, as voters here
no longer update the probability that she is of their type to 1. She will then perform the
strategy if the gains in terms of votes in the targeted group outweigh the loses of votes in
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her own group plus the utility loss in the period before the election.
The following proposition describes the main conclusion.
Proposition 1 Under certain thresholds describing the ordering of densities and intensity
of preferences, given by equation (2.A.4), a political economy equilibrium exists where the
incumbent performs the strategy qPBt . In this equilibrium, the incumbent uses pork barrel
to signal eﬀectively, thereby increasing her re-election probability.
Proof See Appendix 2.A.
Whether this equilibrium exists depends on the ordering of densities and the intensity
of preferences given by μi. When the politician has a preference for the preferred issue of
the group with the highest density, that is, k = 2, for pork barrel to be eﬀective μ1 − μ2
or μ3 − μ2 has to be large enough to compensate the fact that d1, d3 < d2. So, for given
preference intensities, an incumbent is more likely to target highly densely concentrated
groups. This means in particular that the group with the most dispersed ideology, group
3, is less likely to be targeted, as for it to be targeted μ3 would need to be very high. If
this does not happen when a politician has a preference for a more heterogeneous group
signaling is not eﬀective and so the incumbent does not perform the pork barrel strategy.
In practice, if it is eﬀective in terms of altering the voters’ beliefs about the preferences of
the incumbent, delivering pork corresponds to a shift in the position of a given group in
Figure 1 towards the left. This implies that it is always better for the incumbent to target
groups with higher densities. An incumbent will only target a group with a lower density
than the one she has a preference for if the valuation of the preferred issue by that group
is strong enough. Thus, the pork barrel strategy might arise in equilibrium for signaling
purposes, but is less likely to occur towards ideologically heterogeneous groups.
From equation (2.10), whenever πI
qPBt
− πI
qPBt
> 0, that is, whenever equation (2.A.5) is
satisﬁed, the incumbent has an incentive to perform the pork barrel strategy. Her incentive
to do so is larger the larger β is - that is, the more future oriented the politician is - the
larger μk is - that is, the more the incumbent values her preferred issue - the lower the
valuation of Gt and the prior on the challenger’s type λk are, and the higher the payoﬀ
of being in oﬃce, γ, is. Intuitively, an incumbent that is future oriented or has a high
payoﬀ of being in oﬃce is willing to give up more utility in the present in exchange for
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re-election.
These results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The conditions under which pork barrel arises as an equilibrium strategy
for signaling purposes are given by equations (2.10) and (2.A.4). This equilibrium is
characterized by a high density and intensity of preferences of the targeted group, a low
discount factor, a high valuation of the targeted expenditures relative to the public good,
and a high payoﬀ for being in oﬃce.
Empirical Implications
The model derives conditions under which pork barrel may arise as an equilibrium strat-
egy for an incumbent, thus putting forward testable implications. The ﬁrst is that in
majoritarian systems in election years particularistic expenditures should be systemati-
cally higher than those made during the rest of a politician’s mandate. When politicians
behave diﬀerently in election years they are deviating from the policy that maximizes their
ﬁscal utility uIk,t(q
I
t ).
The second and third refer to re-election incentives. Particularly, these distortions should
not take place when a politician cannot be re-elected - when she is a “lame duck” - and
they should be smaller when she is subject to term limits, even when are not binding. The
intuition for the former is that, if an incumbent cannot run for re-election, she does not
have an incentive to signal her preferences through current policy. The latter is a measure
of the time horizon of the politician, and should therefore approximate her discount fac-
tor: if an incumbent is not subject to term limits she has a much higher potential future
payoﬀ, which in our simpliﬁed framework means she has a smaller discount factor. Thus
she should have a higher incentive to perform pork. Finally, we should not see election
year increases in particularistic expenditures if voters with strong preferences for them are
more ideologically dispersed than the average population. If these distortions are in fact
generated by the signaling motive then politicians will choose to perform them towards
groups that are more densely concentrated ideologically and are therefore easier to sway.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
The model is tested for the case of U.S. state level policy, namely for environmental ex-
penditures. Gubernatorial elections in the U.S. more closely approximate the majoritarian
single-district system. This is a particularly suitable laboratory to test the signaling mo-
tive for pork barrel hypothesis for several reasons. The ﬁrst is that U.S. governors have
substantial control over several policy areas, including environmental policy (List and
Sturm (2006)). This provides state governments with signiﬁcant discretion over their ex-
penditures. The second is that the environment triggers strong opinions by the electorate,
which makes it a natural candidate to represent one of the particular issues in the model
that some voters care about. The third is that in the U.S. a large number of surveys
are conducted before elections, such that incumbents are likely to be well informed of
the preferences of the electorate, particularly regarding salient issues. Finally, the large
number of years available and the detail of the data allows for a rich analysis of incentives,
while facilitating the identiﬁcation strategy.
2.4.1 Variable Deﬁnition
A ﬁrst key empirical question is what constitutes pork barrel spending. I deﬁne pork
barrel as the environmental expenditures occurring in election years in excess of what
the politician’s choice would be in the absence of electoral incentives. Accordingly, I use
two alternative measures. The ﬁrst are systematic increases in election year environmental
spending as compared to all non-election years. This measures if in election years decisions
diﬀer from what is optimal in every other year. The second is calculated as the deviation in
the environmental spending level in election years with respect to the average expenditure
for each incumbent politician. This measures whether election year decisions diﬀer from
what is optimal for the same politician in every other year.
In order to measure voters’ environmental preferences and ideological dispersion I use
responses to surveys representative at the state level.16 For each respondent I measure
the degree of environmental preference and the ideological inclination. For the ﬁrst I
create a scale from responses on questions about the importance of the environment and
government’s action regarding the environment, envi, and for the latter I use the answer
16The surveys are described in Section 2.4.4. and Appendix 2.B.
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to the question of whether the respondent is a conservative, moderate, liberal, or does
not think in those terms. I use the latter to create an indicator of ideological dispersion
at the state level, totdispi, by calculating the standard deviation of this measure in each
state. Furthermore, using the degree of environmental preference I classify respondents
into environmentally biased or not, simply by generating a dummy equal to 1 if envi is
higher than the mean of the population and 0 otherwise, and calculating the ideological
dispersion in each state only if the dummy is 1, envdispi. I then calculate the dispersion of
environmental voters’ ideology relative to the total dispersion in state i as dispi =
envdispi
totdispi
.
I experiment with diﬀerent cutoﬀs for the dummy variable, but since the results do not
vary I use only this indicator.
2.4.2 Econometric Model
The analysis aims at assessing the existence of election-year distortions in environmental
spending across states, and the factors contributing to them. The basic empirical model
is given by
Environmentit = α1 + δelyeari,t + α2Xit + ηi + it (2.13)
where Environmentit is the dependent variable, a measure of environmental expenditure
in state i and year t. Two sets of equations will be estimated: one where the dependent
variable is envexpit, real total environmental per capita expenditures in state i at time t,
and one where it is devit, deviations from politician mean in environmental expenditures
in state i at time t.17 As in List and Sturm (2006), total environmental expenditures
are the sum of expenditures in three categories: forests and parks, ﬁsh and games, and
others. They argue they can be pulled together as all three record very similar types
of spending and are used as substitutes. Expenditures are deﬂated to 1982-1984 dollars.
Because increases in environmental expenditures would take place if the politician was
simply increasing all spending in election years, I use total environmental expenditures
as a percentage of total expenditures for envexpit.
18 elyearit is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if year t is the year before an election in state i and 0 otherwise.19 Xit is a vector
17Calculated as envexpit−avP where avP is the average environmental expenditure for a given politician.
18I also present the main estimation using total environmental expenditures, and logged expenditures,
in the last two columns with no qualitative change in results.
19Distortions may take place in the year before election in order to give the electorate more time to
observe changes. Following Veiga and Veiga (2007), I experiment with both election year, the year before
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of economic and demographic variables aﬀecting ﬁscal choices for each state, ηi is a state
ﬁxed eﬀect, and it is the error term. The ﬁxed eﬀect is included to control for unob-
served heterogeneity. Alternatively, the variable measuring how environmentally biased a
population of a given state is, envbiasi, is included. Given that this does not vary with
time, ﬁxed eﬀects are not included when the latter is. The main coeﬃcient of interest
is therefore δ, that measures systematic changes in the dependent variable occurring in
election years. If pork barrel takes place for environmental expenditures this coeﬃcient
should be positive and signiﬁcant.
The control variables included in Xit aim at capturing a given state’s resources and needs.
The variables 17it and 65it, respectively the percentage of people between 5 and 17 and
over 65 years old in state i at time t, measure population needs, taxesit, the real per
capita taxes in state i at time t, and incomeit, the real per capita state income at time t,
provide a measure of the state’s resources, and popit, the state population in millions, is
included to account for economies of scale or congestion eﬀects in the provision of public
goods. Finally, because public expenditures are likely to be persistent over time, I include
a lagged dependent variable, envexpi,t−1 in the estimations using total environmental ex-
penditures, as a percentage of total expenditures, as the dependent variable.
The model with this dependent variable is thus given by:
envexpit = α1 + γenvexpi,t−1 + δelyearit + α2Xit + ηi + it (2.14)
The model having the deviation of environmental expenditures from the politician’s av-
erage as a dependent variable in turn does not include the de lagged dependent variable.
The basic model in that case reduces to:
deviationit = α1 + δelyearit + α2Xit + ηi + it (2.15)
To the basic model I add additional variables, in turn, to test further implications. The
predication that pork occurs less towards ideologically dispersed groups is tested by in-
cluding the interaction of the dispersion index dispi with the election year dummy, while
also including the index separately. For this variable a negative coeﬃcient is expected:
environmental expenditures in election years should be lower in states where citizens with
the election, and the year after. Since the dummy for the year before the election was always statistically
signiﬁcant and that for election years was not I use only the former.
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environmental preferences are dispersed ideologically when compared to those less dis-
persed. To test the prediction that a higher discount rate leads to less environmental
pork I include a dummy variable equal to 1 if state i has term limit legislation at time t
and 0 otherwise, limitit, and an interaction of this with the election year dummy. The
coeﬃcient of the interaction term is expected to be negative, indicating that if the time
horizon of a politician is smaller, incentives to perform pork decrease. Finally, to test
whether politicians who cannot be re-elected have diﬀerent incentives I include lameit,
a dummy equal to 1 if the incumbent is a “lame duck” (is not up for re-election) and 0
otherwise. The interaction of this dummy with the election year dummy thus measures
election year incentives for “lame ducks” as compared to incumbents up for re-election.
Thus a negative sign is expected.
2.4.3 Empirical Issues
Due to unobserved heterogeneity for both dependent variables a Fixed Eﬀects (FE) model
is estimated instead of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, when estimating equation
(2.14), because of the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, the FE estimation biased
as the ﬁxed eﬀect ηi is correlated with it. Thus, following Arellano and Bond (1991), I take
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of equation (2.14) including the lag, thus eliminating the ﬁxed eﬀect,
and use lags of the dependent variable of two or more periods, which are not correlated with
the variable in diﬀerences, as instruments. Their Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
estimates the model parameters directly from the moment conditions and combines the
instruments eﬃciently. However, since there is a high level of persistence I use use the
system GMM (GMMsys) estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond,
1998) which additionally uses the moment conditions for the model in levels, and is more
robust to problems like measurement errors and weak instruments. This method has the
additional beneﬁt of accounting for the possible endogeneity of the states’ environmental
bias, envbiasi.
2.4.4 Data
The database used includes information for the 48 continental states in the US between
1970 and 2000, making a total of 1488 observations.
Data on environmental expenditures as well as all political and demographic variables
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used in the analysis come from List and Sturm (2006). The latter are in turn updated
versions of the data used in Besley and Case (1995) and the former were collected from
the Census of State Governments. Environmental expenditures vary largely across states
and time between a minimum of 6119 and 168297 dollars. The dummy for term limits
includes states with a one, two or three period term limit, and the legislation in several
states changed during the sample period.20
Data on state environmental preferences and ideology was collected from ﬁve surveys, con-
ducted between 1983 and 2007. These surveys were conducted by CBS with the New York
Times, and ABC News with Stanford University and Time Magazine, and are available
from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). They
include questions that measure environmental inclination, such as a classiﬁcation of the
importance of the environment, as well as ideological preferences. According to List and
Sturm (2006), environmental inclination is persistent over time in US states (namely be-
tween 1987 and 2000). Thus I pull together the information on the ﬁve surveys, which
allows me to have 4824 individual observations, from which the state ideological dispersion
and degree of environmental inclination are calculated. The resulting measure of environ-
mental preference is correlated, although varying considerably less, with that of List and
Sturm (2006), consisting of the percentage of state population enroled as a member of the
largest environmental organizations.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the data. The ﬁrst six rows represent the
measures of environmental expenditures used, speciﬁcally: total spending and its three
disaggregated components, environmental spending as a percentage of total expenditures
and the deviation from politician average. The following ﬁve rows include the control
variables, followed by the four electoral variables. These include in addition to the vari-
ables described above, the percentage of democratic vote in a given state and the winning
margin of the party in power - calculated as the percentage share of the governor in the
share of the top two candidates minus 50 - which are used as part of the identiﬁcation
strategy. Finally the last rows are the variables derived from the survey data. Appendix
2.B describes the surveys in more detail and presents maps with the resulting measures of
environmental bias and ideological dispersion index.
20A description of the term legislation in each state, as well as detailed sources, can be found in List and
Sturm (2006).
56
Chapter 2. Pork Barrel as a Signaling Tool: The Case of US Environmental
Policy
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Environmental Expenditures 27.058 16.983 6.119 168.297 1488
Fish & Game 6.836 6.697 0.515 52.086 1488
Forests & Parks 11.522 6.712 0.560 58.666 1488
Other Environmental 8.701 9.026 0.164 118.244 1488
Environmental Percentage 1.823 0.833 0.515 6.81 1488
Deviation 0 5.268 -29.86 44.458 1488
Taxes in State 0.817 0.219 0.316 1.731 1488
Personal Income 12.914 2.537 6.745 24.093 1488
State Population in millions 4.955 5.191 0.333 34.002 1488
Percentage between 5-17 0.209 0.029 0.071 0.304 1488
Percentage over 65 0.118 0.02 0.04 0.188 1488
Lame Duck 0.261 0.439 0 1 1488
Term Limits 0.606 0.489 0 1 1488
Percentage Democrat Vote 0.526 0.089 0.218 0.946 1488
Winning Margin 8.396 7.737 0 50 1448
Environmental Preference 13.044 4.632 3.609 31.888 1488
Dispersion Index 0.92 0.214 0.203 1.415 1488
Dispersion Environmentalists 1.471 0.530 0.794 3.479 1488
State Ideological Dispersion 1.68 0.748 0.773 5.581 1488
Sources: List and Sturm (2006) and ICPSR.
2.5 Results
The results from the dynamic model in equation (2.14) are presented in Table 2.2. Columns
(1) to (7) present the results where the dependent variable is real per capita environmental
expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures. Because this variable is very small, in
order to make the coeﬃcients easier to read, it was multiplied by ten. Thus the coeﬃcients
have to be interpreted accordingly. In order to verify that the variation is indeed driven
by environmental, and not total, spending, column (8) presents the results of the basic
estimation using as a dependent variable total real per capita environmental expenditures.
Column (9) presents the same estimation with logs of all the variables (except for the
percentages). The results to not change qualitatively.
All estimations include the lagged dependent variable and the main variable of interest,
elyeari. This variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant across all estimations. The
ﬁrst two columns show the results for the dynamic model without controls estimated by
OLS and FE. Although biased, these estimations are used as a benchmark for the consis-
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tent GMMsys estimations. They show a high persistence of environmental expenditures,
corroborated by the GMMsys estimation in column (3). The latter places the coeﬃcient of
the lagged dependent variable between the upward biased OLS estimation and the down-
ward biased FE estimation.
All GMMsys estimations use a two-step estimation with a ﬁnite sample correction for
standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005). They are robust to heteroskedasticity and error term
serial correlation. Since the results show there exists ﬁrst but not second order autocorre-
lation, I use two or more lags of the dependent variable as instruments, while considering
the demographic variables exogenous. The political variables are also considered exoge-
nous, while state taxes and income are considered pre-determined. Accordingly, only lags
of the latter of at least one period are used as instruments. Finally, environmental bias and
ideological dispersion are also considered endogenous. As having too many instruments
may invalidate the estimation, all instruments are collapsed. The Hansen test for each
estimation validates the instruments.
In columns (3)and (4) the basic model is estimated. Column (4) includes the time-invariant
environmental bias by state, envbiasi. This variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
at a 10% conﬁdence level.The results show that environmental expenditures present a large
degree of persistence, with a coeﬃcient between 0.575 and 0.685 statistically signiﬁcant at
a 1% conﬁdence level. In election years expenditures increase on average between 3.131
and 3.637, which is signiﬁcant at a 5% and 10% level respectively. The coeﬃcient on the
population is negative, suggesting the existence of economies of scale in environmental
expenditures.
Finally, columns (5) to (7) present the results of the predictions of the model regarding
features that increase incentives for pork barrel with signaling purposes. In column (5) the
coeﬃcient for dispi×elyearit is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% level, corrob-
orating the predictions of the model. It means that in election years, states with higher
ideological dispersion than the average receive less environmental expenditures relative to
those less dispersed, which indicates that incumbents choose to use their budget for other
types of spending. The dispersion index is not statistically signiﬁcant. Column (6) tests
the “lame duck” hypothesis. The results show that although in the last term incumbents
tend to spend more, politicians that are “lame duck” spend less in the year before the
election as compare to those that can be re-elected: the coeﬃcient for lameit × elyearit
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, column (7) reports results for the eﬀect
59
Chapter 2. Pork Barrel as a Signaling Tool: The Case of US Environmental
Policy
of term limits. They show that environmental expenditures in years before election are
smaller for states with term limit legislation in place by 7.23$, and this diﬀerence is statis-
tically signiﬁcant at a 5% level. This is in accordance with the prediction that politicians
with a smaller time horizon in oﬃce have less incentives to perform pork.
Finally, the results from the estimations of equation (2.20), using the mandate mean
deviations, are presented in Table 2.3. Only the coeﬃcients for the variables of interest are
presented, although the estimations include the same control variables as before. Columns
(1) and (2) present the results for the basic estimation. Column (1) does not include the
state environmental bias as an explanatory variable and so is estimated using FE. Column
(2) is estimated with simple OLS. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered over states. The estimations show that in the year before an election incumbents
spend on average over 0.65$ more than their yearly average environmental expenditure,
indicating that politicians systematically deviate from their optimal level. If signaling is
in fact driving these results we should see deviations in elections that are less likely to be
decided by an ideological bias - if the ideological bias is too high then pork barrel is less
likely to swing enough voters. Thus I run the regression in column (1) while cutting the
sample to include only states where the average democratic vote share is smaller than 0.7
and larger than 0.3. The results are reported in column (3) and show that the coeﬃcient
for the election dummy is again statistically signiﬁcant, and even higher than that of the
full sample. This indicates that when elections are less likely to be decided on the basis
of ideology, incumbents have an even higher incentive to use environmental expenditures
as pork barrel. Additionally, incentives to perform these policies should be seen in close
elections if the signaling motive is behind them. Thus I estimate the same equation
restricting the sample to elections where the incumbent won with a winning margin of
15% or less. The results are presented in Column (4) and again the coeﬃcient of the
year before election is statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, I restrict the sample to include
both only states with small ideological biases and close elections. The results are reported
in column (5) and the coeﬃcient is once again statistically signiﬁcant, and higher than
that of the unrestricted sample. I additionally test whether this behavior is particular
to incumbents of a given ideology by including a dummy equal to 1 if the incumbent
is a democrat and the interaction of this with the election dummy. The coeﬃcients are
never signiﬁcant, indicating that politicians deviate from their mandate means regardless
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of their ideological inclination.21
Table 2.3: Election Year Deviations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted
Ideology Margin Both
elyearit 0.685* 0.656* 0.797* 0.791** 0.959**
(0.0762) (0.0720) (0.0609) (0.0449) (0.0287)
envbiasi -0.00610
(0.616)
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,339 1,111 1,050
R-squared 0.049 0.0405 0.044 0.049 0.047
Number of states 48 48 48 48 48
Estimation FE OLS FE FE FE
P-values in parentheses. Dependent variable devit. Robust standard errors.
Cluster envbiasi; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents evidence of the existence of pork barrel spending with signaling
purposes. A simple model of electoral competition derives conditions under which pork
arises in equilibrium for an incumbent to signal preferences for diﬀerent issues, for which
groups in the population care about diﬀerently. The resulting conditions are tested for the
case of US state environmental expenditures. Environmental issues are likely to be subject
to electoral manipulation since they elicit strong preferences from particular subgroups.
The empirical analysis shows support for the theoretical model. There are systematic
increases in environmental spending in years before election across states, both when
compared to every other year and when compared to a politician’s average choices. These
are smaller when the environmentally biased groups are more ideologically dispersed, when
term limits are implemented (which proxy for the incumbent having a high discount rate),
and when the politician cannot be re-elected. Additionally, these distortions are visible
when restricting our attention to elections that are less likely to be decided on the basis
of ideology and close elections.
21These results, as well as results using diﬀerent cutoﬀs, are available upon request.
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These results have important implications for the theoretical literature on politically driven
policy distortions, as well as for governance discussions. First, I present empirical evidence
of the signaling motive for pork barrel across issues and not geographic groups. To the
best of my knowledge no study has shown this before. This allows to corroborate the
assumptions made in several theoretical studies. Second, the fact that more homogeneous
groups are targeted more often has implications for the literature on the formation and
inﬂuence of special interest groups. It suggests that groups that are organized around
ideology will be more able to attract beneﬁts from politicians seeking re-election. Finally,
the results show that issues that elicit strong preferences from the electorate are prone to
distortions to get electoral advantage, through the signaling mechanism. This makes them
particularly subject to electoral cycle variations. In particular for environmental policy,
which requires continued action across time in order to be eﬃcient, this has important
implications. Namely, mechanisms restraining the discretionary power of politicians that
limit the size of electorally driven cycles could increase the eﬃciency of environmental
policy, by protecting it from electoral incentives.
Appendix
2.A Political Economic Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 1
Denoting the targeted group j, voters in all groups update their beliefs that the politi-
cian is of types k, and symmetrically j, according to:
Pr
(
I = k|qPBt
)
=
Pr(qPBt |I = i).λi
Pr(qPBt |I = k).λk + Pr(qPBt |I = −k)(1− λk)
(2.16)
with i = {k, j}.
To solve for the equilibrium, I ﬁrst assume that the incumbent has an incentive to
perform the pork barrel policy, and then check whether this is true. So Pr(qPBt |I = k) = 1
and Pr(qPBt |I = −k) = λ
j
λj+λ−j−k . Substituting in the previous expression, we have that
for voters in group k, and symmetrically for those of group j:
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εk = ϕkμkgk,t+1 (2.17)
where
ϕk =
λk
[
1− λk − (1− λk) λj
λj+λ−k−j
]
λk + (1− λk) λj
λj+λ−k−j
> 0 (2.18)
Once again, for the group whose preferred issue is not spent on, ε−k−j = −λ−k−jμg−k−j,t+1.
Substituting in the re-election probabilities we have that the diﬀerence in re-election prob-
abilities for an incumbent of type k of performing or not pork barrel by targeting group j
is given by:
πI
qPBt
− πI
qPBt
= (2.19)
z
3∑
i=1
di
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣dkμkgk,t+1
(
λk − 1) λj
λj+λ−k−j
λk + (1− λk) λj
λj+λ−k−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+djμjgj,t+1
λj
λj + (1− λj) λk
λk+λ−k−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Since A is negative and B is positive, and gk,t+1 = gj,t+1, whether (2.A.4) is positive
or negative depends solely on the ordering of densities and the intensity of preferences
given by μi. When the politician has a preference for the group with the highest density’s
preferred issue, that is, k = 2, for (A.4) to be positive and so pork barrel to be eﬀective
μ1 − μ2 or μ3 − μ2 has to be large enough to compensate the fact that d1, d3 < d2.
Substituting equation (2.A.4) into equation (2.10), the condition under which the strat-
egy qPBt constitutes an equilibrium is given by:
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v(GPBt )− v(G∗t ) < (2.20)
β
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝ z3∑
i=1
di
[
dkμkgk,t+1A+ d
jμjgj,t+1B
]
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
([
1− λk
]
μkgk,t+1 + γ
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
2.B Survey Description
The data used to create the variables measuring ideological dispersion and environmental
bias at the state level were collected from four surveys. All the surveys were accessed
through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and I
used only surveys that included both questions measuring preferences towards the envi-
ronment and ideology. The ﬁrst two were conducted by CBS News and New York Times,
respectively in April and June of 1983. They were a part of a larger set of surveys per-
formed throughout the year to collect the electorate’s views on several subjects (CBS News
et al., 1984). To create the environmental preference index I used the response to whether
the environment was the most important (or second most important) problem at the time.
To create the ideological dispersion I used the respondents’ self classiﬁcation into Liberal,
Moderate, Conservative, or Does Not Think in Those Terms. I re-classiﬁed the latter as
“Moderate” voters, and calculated the standard deviation. The third was conducted by
ABC News, Stanford University, and Time Magazine in March 2006 (ABC News et al.,
2006) and the fourth by ABC News, The Washington Post, and Stanford University in
April 2007 (ABC News et al., 2007). To create the environmental index I used the response
to the question of how important the respondent considers respectively the environment
and global warming, on a scale of 1 to 5, as well as other similar questions. The same
ideological classiﬁcation was used. The total number of observations in the four surveys
put together is 4824.
The ﬁgures below map the resulting measures. Fig.2.A.1 maps the environmental bias by
state and ﬁg.2.A.2 the ideological dispersion of environmentally biased voters as the share
of total state environmental dispersion.
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Figure 2.2: Environmental Bias
[3.61,10.78]
(10.78,12.72]
(12.72,13.51]
(13.51,31.89]
Figure 2.3: Ideological Dispersion Index
[0.20,0.88]
(0.88,0.96]
(0.96,0.98]
(0.98,1.41]
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Chapter 3
Interactions in local governments’
spending decisions: Evidence from
Portugal
With Linda Veiga and Miguel Portela
3.1 Introduction
Strategic interaction among governments has been a signiﬁcant matter in public ﬁnance
and regional science for quite a long time. This chapter builds on this literature by
investigating if Portuguese local governments’ spending decisions inﬂuence each other.
This is a major issue to understand the distribution of expenditures across municipalities,
and the impact of budget decentralization policies. The institutional reforms that Portugal
is implementing under the ﬁnancial assistance program agreed with the IMF and the
EU, in May 2011, renders additional relevance to the topic. In order to promote ﬁscal
consolidation, it is important to gain new insights into public policy decisions at the local
level.
To our knowledge, interactions between Portuguese local governments have never been
investigated. Veiga and Veiga (2007), found strong evidence of strategic manipulation of
expenditures’ levels and composition by mayors, as more is spent in election years on items
that are highly visible to the electorate. They control for transfers received from the central
government and for the demographic and political characteristics of the municipalities.
However, they did not take into account that the actions of a local government may aﬀect
the policy decisions of its neighbors. An important ﬁnding of the present chapter is that
an increase in a municipality’s neighbors’ expenditures increases its own expenditures due
to spillover eﬀects and mimicking behavior. This is particularly relevant for investment
decisions.
Portugal is also an interesting case study because municipalities are all subject to the same
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rules and legislation, have the same policy instruments and resources at their disposal,
and local politicians have some discretionary power over them. Additionally, a large and
detailed data set is available (all mainland municipalities from 1986 to 2006), allowing the
analysis of spending in speciﬁc categories. Furthermore, in mainland Portugal there is only
one level of local government and, therefore, the estimated magnitude of municipalities’
ﬁscal interaction cannot be attributed to vertical externalities among diﬀerent levels of
authorities, as may occur in many countries that have a multi-tier structure of government.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the
literature, and section 3.3 describes the Portuguese institutional framework. In section
3.4, the empirical methodology is laid out, and in section 3.5 the empirical results for the
geographical matrices are presented. Finally, section 3.6 presents the results for alternative
weighting matrices and section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature Review
Interjurisdictional interaction is largely acknowledged in the ﬁscal federalism literature1
and its consequences in terms of policy choices and eﬃciency have been broadly studied.
The empirical literature on strategic interaction between decentralized levels of government
is typically divided into three categories: tax and welfare competition, beneﬁt spillovers,
and yardstick competition.2 The ﬁrst includes models where a jurisdiction is aﬀected by
the choices of other jurisdictions as a result of the existence of a particular resource that
they share: the tax-competition literature studies how taxes are chosen strategically when
they are levied by governments on a mobile tax base, and that on welfare competition
analyzes the strategic choices of governments regarding welfare beneﬁt levels, as a result
of the mobility of the poor.3 Research on spillovers investigates if public expenditure of
a jurisdiction generates beneﬁcial or negative eﬀects that spread across its boundaries,
aﬀecting the welfare of residents in neighboring jurisdictions. It tries to assess whether
1See Oates (1999) for a survey. Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2006b) survey the empirical research on
strategic interaction among local governments.
2An exception is Allers and Elhorst (2011) that studies ﬁscal policy interactions in Dutch municipalities,
in an integrated way. They estimate a system of simultaneous equations for expenditures and taxes, taking
into account diﬀerences in spending needs between jurisdictions. They argue that in single equation models
the degree of interaction is estimated ineﬃciently.
3Examples of the latter include Brueckner (1998), Saavedra (2000), Allers and Elhorst (2005), Fiva and
Rattsø (2006), Revelli (2006b), and Redoano (2007).
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decisions of a local government depend on policies chosen elsewhere. If expenditures refer
to local public goods that are complementary, such as environmental services or infras-
tructure and road building, expenditures in neighboring jurisdictions are likely to boost
local governments’ own expenditures. However, if local public goods are substitutable (i.e.
sports, recreational and schooling facilities) the reverse may occur. Finally, yardstick com-
petition models, often considered to ﬁt the beneﬁt spillover framework, assess how voters,
in an asymmetric information setting, use neighboring jurisdictions’ public services and
taxes to judge their own government’s performance. Not having complete information on
the cost of public goods and services, they compare the expenditures and tax levels they
face with those most easily observable - those of nearby jurisdictions (Salmon, 1987).4
Since the main purpose of this chapter is to analyze the extent to which municipalities’
spending is inﬂuenced by the spending of neighboring municipalities, and the possible
sources of this interdependence, we focus our attention on empirical studies of spillovers.
The pioneering work of Case et al. (1993) formalizes a model for the United States, in
which a jurisdiction’s welfare is assumed to depend, among others, on the public spend-
ing in neighborhood jurisdictions. Neighbor is deﬁned not only in terms of geographic
proximity, but also in terms of economic and demographic similarities. Their results pro-
vide strong evidence that states’ expenditures are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by those of their
neighbors, in line with theoretical models of beneﬁt spillovers among jurisdictions.
Since Case et al. (1993), several studies have improved our understanding of how and
to what extent spillovers result from local expenditure policies. Hanes (2002) studies
Swedish local rescue services and concludes that municipalities respond negatively to ben-
eﬁt spillovers from neighboring municipalities. Using data for Swiss cantons, Schaltegger
and Ku¨ttel (2002) argue that ﬁscal autonomy and direct democracy reduces policy mim-
icking. Revelli (2003) builds up a theoretical framework with horizontal and vertical ﬁscal
externalities in a multi-tier structure of government, in order to assess the source of spatial
dependence between English local governments’ expenditures. He concludes that, when
vertical interaction is accounted for, the magnitude of the horizontal interactions signiﬁ-
cantly decreases. Baicker (2005) uses exogenous shocks to state medical spending in the
US to examine the eﬀect of that spending on neighboring states. She ﬁnds substantial
4Besley and Case (1995) present empirical evidence of yardstick competition using US state data. For
European countries refer to Bordignon et al. (2003), Sole´ Olle´ (2003), Allers and Elhorst (2005), Revelli
(2006a), and Redoano (2007). Caldeira (2012) analyzes the Chinese case.
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spillover eﬀects, and concludes that states are most inﬂuenced by neighboring states from
or to which their citizens are most likely to move. Sole´-Olle´ (2006) presents a frame-
work to analyze and test for two types of expenditure spillovers: beneﬁt spillovers and
crowding spillovers, which arise from the crowding of facilities by residents in neighboring
jurisdictions. Estimations of expenditure reaction functions for Spanish local governments
reveal that spillovers are stronger in urban areas than in the rest of the country, and that
both kinds of spillovers occur in the suburbs, while for the city centers only crowding
spillovers are relevant. Focusing on cultural spending of Flemish municipalities, Werck
et al. (2008) ﬁnd that large municipalities aﬀect their neighbors’ behavior diﬀerently from
small municipalities. And, ﬁnally, Ermini and Santolini (2010) conﬁrm the existence of
interdependence among local councils’ expenditure decisions in Italy, and suggest it may
be driven by spill-over.
All the above mentioned studies used maximum-likelihood or instrumental variables to
address the problem of endogeneity of the expenditure interaction variable, since expendi-
ture in one jurisdiction depends on expenditure in another jurisdiction, but the reverse is
also true. Recently, a growing body of research has started to implement the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) in the context of spatial interaction. Using a dynamic panel
of European Union countries, Redoano (2007) ﬁnds evidence of strategic behavior by cen-
tral governments on taxes and expenditures. She concludes that: (1) for corporate taxes,
European countries follow large countries, while for income and public expenditures, ﬁs-
cal interactions are driven by yardstick competition; (2) interdependency decreases when
countries join the EU. Foucault et al. (2008) test the existence of public spending interac-
tions between French municipalities in a dynamic panel data model. Their results suggest
the existence of spending interactions in investment and primary expenditures between
neighboring municipalities and between cities whose mayors have the same partisan aﬃl-
iation. They ﬁnd evidence of opportunistic behavior in pre-electoral periods (Rogoﬀ and
Sibert, 1988), but not of yardstick competition.
To the best of our knowledge, the Portuguese case has never been investigated. The topic
assumes additional relevance because of the sovereign debt crisis that the country is facing.
One of the structural reforms agreed by the national authorities with the IMF and the
EU in 2011, under the ﬁnancial assistance program, is to reduce the number of local juris-
dictions. Better knowledge on expenditure policy decision-making by local governments
is therefore necessary.
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3.3 Portuguese Institutional Framework
According to the Portuguese Constitution, there are three types of local governments:
parishes (freguesias), municipalities, and administrative regions. However, administra-
tive regions have not yet been implemented in mainland Portugal, due to the rejection
of the proposal to institute them in a national referendum, in 1998; there are only two
autonomous regions: Azores and Madeira. In the mainland there are currently 278 mu-
nicipalities, and in the autonomous regions 30. Our data set does not include these 30
overseas municipalities, given the diﬀerences in the territorial organization, the fact that
inhabitants of the islands may have diﬀerent needs from those living in continental Europe,
and that the status of ultra-peripheral regions allows them to receive additional European
Union’s funds. We focus our attention on municipalities because freguesias, which are the
lowest administrative unit in Portugal, have a very limited scope of functions.
Local governments in Portugal have their own property and ﬁnances, and are all subject
to the same laws and regulations. Since the reestablishment of democracy in Portugal, in
April 1974, there has been a progressive decentralization of competencies from the Central
Government to local authorities. Nevertheless, the weight of local governments in general
government ﬁnances is modest compared to other European Union (EU) countries. The
Local Power Law of 1977 (Law 79/77) deﬁned the competencies of municipalities and the
division of power among their organs of sovereignty, 5 emphasizing infrastructural inter-
ventions, such as the improvement of accessibilities, sewage, and the distribution of water
and electricity. In 1984, new legislation (Decree-Law 77/84) was approved enlarging mu-
nicipalities’ competencies to areas such as rural and urban equipment, culture, leisure and
sports, transportation and communication, education, and health care. When Portugal
joined the European Economic Community, in 1986, the ﬁnancial situation of municipal-
ities improved considerably, as they started receiving European structural and cohesion
funds. Increased resources allowed municipalities to implement several measures that had
been delayed due to lack of funds, and to devote greater care to other activities, such as
the promotion of culture. Furthermore, more attention was paid to territorial organization
and to the establishment of networks with foreign municipalities, namely Spanish juris-
dictions near the border. A new law was enacted in 1999 (Law 159/99), which extended
5Legislative power in municipalities belongs to the Municipal Assembly, while the executive power rests
with the Town Council, where the mayor has a prominent role.
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municipalities’ attributions regarding the provision of social and cultural services, urban
rehabilitation, protection of the environment, consumer protection, promotion of tourist
activities, territorial planning and urbanism, external cooperation, and the attraction of
corporate activities. Finally, the current Local Finance Law (Law 2/2007) assigned new
responsibilities to municipalities in the areas of education and health care, among others.
Municipalities account for the bulk of consolidated expenditures of the local administra-
tions. Municipal public expenditures are divided into capital and current expenditures.
The former include investment, their main component, capital transfers to parishes, ﬁnan-
cial assets and liabilities, and other capital expenditures. Until 2001, investment expen-
ditures included miscellaneous constructions (and subcomponents), acquisition of land,
housing, transportation material, machinery and equipment, other buildings (and sub-
components), and other investments.6 As for current expenditures, their sub-components
are expenditures on goods and services, ﬁnancial expenditures, human resources, current
transfers to parishes, and other current expenditures.
The main sources of municipal revenue are:
• Transfers from the central government. These address both vertical and horizontal
imbalances, and include formula based transfers, matching grants (national and EU
funds), and others.
• Local taxes: property, property transfer, vehicle and corporate income taxes are the
most important. The property tax is the largest own-revenue source of municipali-
ties, who have autonomy to set the tax rates, within a band. Local governments can
levy an optional corporate income tax surcharge on taxpayers that operate businesses
or have a permanent establishment in the municipal jurisdiction. The rate can vary
from zero to a maximum deﬁned nationally. Municipalities have little discretionary
power over the property transfer and vehicle taxes.
• Other revenues: fees and ﬁnes, property income, and ﬁnancial liabilities, among
others.
The decentralization process in Portugal also had a reﬂection on the importance of each
source of revenue. Transfers represented 63% of local governments’ revenues in 1986, but
6In 2002, investment accounts were reorganized into the following categories: acquisition of land, build-
ings and other constructions (and subcomponents), transportation material, machinery and equipment
and, ﬁnally, others.
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they only account for 43% in 2006. On the other hand, the weight of items where the local
government has more discretionary power increased. Taxes increased their share on total
revenues from 18% to 33%, and other revenues from 19% to 24%. The ﬁscal situation of
municipalities has deteriorated markedly in past years, generating ﬁscal imbalances and
the accumulation of debt.
Given that transfers from the central government still represent the main source of mu-
nicipal revenues; local governments have greater autonomy to establish their expenditure
levels and composition than revenues. Therefore, this chapter focuses on expenditures
to test for interactions between neighboring municipalities. It is important to note that
mayors have greater control over investment expenditures than over current expenditures,
since items such as salaries are quite rigid. Furthermore, investment expenditures can be
used by local decision makers to attract corporate activity and households, and to gain
votes in municipal elections.
3.4 Empirical Framework and Econometric Procedure
The purpose of this chapter is to test for strategic interaction in per capita expenditure
levels in Portuguese municipalities, and to understand the reasons for its occurrence. If
there is interaction, jurisdiction i’s spending levels depend not only on their own economic
and demographic characteristics, but also on the spending levels chosen by nearby munic-
ipalities. There can be either positive or negative correlation in local public expenditure
levels, depending on the eﬀect that the neighbor jurisdictions’ expenditures have on the
marginal utility of a given municipality’s public spending. They will have a positive eﬀect
if public goods or services supplied by these neighbors are complements of the municipal-
ity’s own goods, and a negative eﬀect if they are substitutes. Municipality i’s reaction
function can be described as:
Git = β1 + αWGit + β2munit + it (3.1)
where Git is real per capita expenditure in jurisdiction i at time t; WGit is a weighted
average of neighboring municipality’s real per capita expenditures (W is a geographical
weighted matrix), that is, WGit =
∑
j =iwijtGjt; munit is a vector of economic and
demographic variables for each jurisdiction, aﬀecting their ﬁscal choices, and it is an error
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term.
The rationale behind this is that citizens may derive beneﬁts from public goods and services
provided by their own municipality and by neighboring municipalities. Thus, a welfare
maximizing government will maximize the following objective function:
F (Git,WGit;munit) (3.2)
Solving the ﬁrst order condition, a given municipality i will choose Git according to the
reaction function Git = R (WGit;munit), which consists of its best response to the deci-
sions of other municipalities, taking into account its own characteristics. If there are no
spillovers regarding public expenditures, then WGit does not enter the reaction function
- the coeﬃcient α in equation (3.1) will be zero.
Since municipalities have a broad range of responsibilities and produce several goods and
services, expenditure decisions also involve choosing on which goods and services resources
should be allocated. Therefore, we test for interactions on the expenditure level as well
as on the composition of expenditures. In a regression framework the dependent variable
is the logarithm of real per capita expenditures. Several items of expenditure are con-
sidered alternatively: total expenditures, capital expenditures, current expenditures, and
investment expenditures and its main components.
3.4.1 Speciﬁcation of the weight matrix
It is highly important to properly select a criterion to deﬁne neighbors, given that a
misspeciﬁcation of the weight matrix may lead to inconsistent estimates and aﬀect the
coeﬃcients’ interpretation.(Anselin, 1988) The choice of adequate weight matrices is an
open discussion within the spatial econometrics literature. Several approaches have been
followed to specify the elements of the weight matrix, and no consensus has been achieved
on which is better suited for spatial econometric analysis. The matrix has to be speci-
ﬁed according to a criterion that reﬂects previous expectations about the spatial pattern
of interaction and, to some extent, reﬂect economic mechanisms at the base of such in-
teraction. Cheshire and Magrini (2009) argue that exhaustive experimentation with the
spatial weight matrix is needed. In the discussion that follows we will discuss diﬀerent
weight matrices within our data. Following the trend in the literature, we assume that a
municipality is not considered its own neighbor, so the matrix has zero diagonal values.
73
Chapter 3. Interactions in local governments’ spending decisions: Evidence from
Portugal
A commonly used method is to assign weights based on contiguity.7 One way to apply this
scheme is to assign values of 0 and 1 to the structure of neighbors - binary contiguity. This
would imply wij =
1
mi
for municipalities j that share a border with municipality i, and
wij = 0 otherwise; where mi is the number of municipalities contiguous to i. Such matrix
(W 0), was created for our sample and later used in the estimation for total expenditures,
as a robustness test. However, as discussed by Anselin (1988) this method does not supply
a full representation of the degree of spatial interaction present in the data. It is frequent,
after Cliﬀ and Ord (1981) to assign diﬀerent weights to the neighbors, according to the
degree to which they aﬀect municipality i, so that
∑
j Wij = 1. Diﬀerent weights may
be assigned according to geographical distance, or other variables aﬀecting interactions,
namely demographic, economic or political variables.
Following several papers in the literature, we also deﬁned neighbors according to the Eu-
clidean distance between the centers of the municipalities, and constructed the weights as
the inverse of this measure. Firstly, and given that Portugal is a relatively small country,
all municipalities were considered neighbors (W T ). Secondly, and in order to investigate
the robustness of the results, we limited the municipalities that are considered neighbors
to those that distance x or less kilometers (W x), with x = 50 and 100km. This is be-
cause beneﬁts are more likely to be internalized by municipalities that are closer. In all
the speciﬁcations the eﬀect of neighbors is smaller the further away they are. The choice
of 100km was based on the fact that the maximum frequency of distances between Por-
tuguese municipalities is for 100km, and that of 50km was based on the limits generally
used in empirical literature on spillovers between local governments. Additionally, 50km
is the distance from which a journey is considered medium or long distance.
Hence, municipality i’s expenditures are assumed to be aﬀected by the expenditures of all
its neighbors, in inverse proportion to their distances to i and are normalized afterwards,
so that
∑
j Wij = 1. Thus, wij is deﬁned as:
wij =
1
distij∑
j
1
distij
(3.3)
7See Besley and Case (1995).
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or
wij =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
distij∑
j
1
distij
if 0 < dij ≤ xkm
0 otherwise
for the ﬁrst (W T ) and second (W x) speciﬁcations, respectively. Hence, each observa-
tion Git is associated to its spatially lagged counterpart, WGit =
∑
j =iwijtGjt, which is
a linear combination of the observations for all i’s neighbors.
As a result, four matrices were created: one based on geographical contiguity and three
distance decay matrices. Each W is, therefore, a 275x275 matrix for the period 1986-
1998, and a 278x278 matrix, for the period 1999-2006, with zero diagonal elements.8 We
chose the geographical criterion to compute the weight matrix because beneﬁt spillovers
depend on the mobility of the population, which, in turn, depends on the distance between
municipalities.9
3.4.2 Econometric issues
According to the model, municipality i’s expenditures in year t depend on municipality j’s
expenditures, and municipality’s j’s expenditures also depend on those of i. If municipali-
ties react to each other’s spending decisions contemporaneously, then WGit is endogenous
in model (3.1) and correlated with the contemporaneous error term:
E{itWGit = 0} (3.4)
In this situation, the Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) estimator is biased and inconsis-
tent and there are two possible solutions: Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Instrumental
Variables (IV). The ﬁrst solution consists in inverting the system, in order to eliminate
the dependent variables from the right-hand side of the estimating equation, and using
a non-linear optimization routine to estimate the spatial coeﬃcient. Examples of papers
using this approach are Case et al. (1993), Besley and Case (1995), Brueckner (1998), and
Foucault et al. (2008). However, this procedure is computationally demanding, especially
with a large dataset with panel observations. Another possible solution for this problem
8Three municipalities were created in 1998: Trofa, Odivelas and Vizela.
9An alternative way to measure municipalities’ interaction would be to use economic ﬂows across regions.
However, the data is not readily available for our analysis.
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would be an instrumental variable two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure, using as in-
struments the neighbors’ variables (munjt) that inﬂuence their ﬁscal decisions and are not
correlated with the error term. Thus, in line with numerous empirical studies, these would
be all considered strictly exogenous and would be weighted by W . Several papers have
used this method successfully, such as Kelejian and Robinson (1993), Revelli (2002), and
Sole´-Olle´ (2006). Another empirical problem concerning the estimation of a spatial model
is that there may be spatial dependence in the error term, given by:
it = λWit + μit (3.5)
where μit it is a white noise error term, uncorrelated between municipalities. If this er-
ror correlation is ignored, false evidence of strategic interaction may be provided by the
estimation. ML solves this by incorporating this error structure, and IV generates consis-
tent estimates of α even in the presence of spatial error correlation (Kelejian and Prucha
(1998). Due to the fact that we are dealing with panel data, we have to consider unob-
served heterogeneity. Thus, we augmented equation (3.1) with an individual municipality
eﬀect. Additionally, we included time eﬀects, with year speciﬁc intercepts, in order to
control for macroeconomic variables that aﬀect all municipalities at the same time. As
noted by Case et al. (1993), these are particularly important so that spending correlations
between jurisdictions caused by common national level shocks are not given spatial signif-
icance. Finally, according to Veiga and Veiga (2007), Portuguese municipalities’ level of
per capita real expenditures exhibits a high level of persistency. Hence, we also included
a lag of the dependent variable, Gt−1. The model to be tested can, then, be speciﬁed as
follows:
Git = β1 + γGit−1 + αWGit + β2munit + ηi + ρt + it (3.6)
where ηi is the individual eﬀect and ρt are time eﬀects.
Because Gt−1 was included, by construction it will be correlated with the individual eﬀect,
ηi. In order to solve this problem, and following Arellano and Bond (1991), we can take
ﬁrst-diﬀerences of equation (3.6) to eliminate ηi and use as instruments for Gt−1 lagged
levels of the dependent variable from two or more periods before - which are not correlated
with the residuals in diﬀerences, assuming no serial correlation in it. The neighboring
variable, being endogenous, can be instrumented in a similar way. Thus, the estima-
tion may be conducted with instrumental variables, more speciﬁcally by the Generalized
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Method of Moments (as discussed in Arellano and Bond, 1991 - GMM - which combines
the instruments eﬃciently. It does so by estimating the model parameters directly from
the moment conditions. However, since we suspect high persistence in expenditures, the
use of the System GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond,
1998) might be the appropriate solution. This extended estimator combines the moment
conditions for the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences and for the model in levels, and is especially
suitable when there is a high level of persistency in the dependent variable - it is less
biased and more precise. It also allows correcting for econometric problems such as weak
instruments and measurement errors. Given its properties, we will consider this solution
throughout our empirical analysis, comparing it, where appropriate, with the OLS, Fixed
Eﬀects (FE) and GMM applied to ﬁrst-diﬀerences (GMM-Dif) alternatives. The validity
of the instruments later used in our estimations will be checked using the Hansen test for
overidentifying restrictions. We will speciﬁcally address the presence of heteroskedasticity
in our data. Additionally, in each regression, following Arellano and Bond (1991) we will
investigate whether the residuals are serially correlated. Several estimation procedures
have been proposed for spatial models, but the only method that incorporates spatial
dependence, temporal lags and other endogenous variables is the system GMM estimator
(GMM-Sys).10 Recently, Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) by performing a Monte Carlo
Investigation, found the extended GMM to be suitable to estimate dynamic spatial lag
models, especially when N and/or T are large.
3.4.3 Data and empirical model
The empirical model consists of an equation where municipality i’s real per capita expen-
diture in year t (Git), depends on its lagged value, its own characteristics and on the real
per capita expenditures of the neighboring municipalities (Gjt) in the same year.
11 The
following variables are used to capture municipalities’ resources and needs:
• grantit is total real per capita transfers from the central government. Since grants
represent the main source of municipalities’ revenues, a positive and large coeﬃ-
cient is expected. Capgrantit and Currgrantit are, respectively, capital grants and
10For a description of estimators dealing with spatial and time dependence in panel datasets see Kukenova
and Monteiro (2009).
11In preliminary analysis we tested for strategic interaction over time, but additional lags of weighted
expenditures by neighboring municipalities never turned out as statistically signiﬁcant.
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current grants. They are included, instead of total grants, in the regressions hav-
ing as a dependent variable capital, investment and its components, and current
expenditures.
• popdensit represents the population density, in jurisdiction i at time t. It proxies for
the level of urbanization and allow us to test for congestion eﬀects or scale economies
in the provision of local public goods and services.
• In order to pick up diﬀerences in population needs, we consider the dependency ratio
(dependit), which is the proportion of population in the municipality that is under
15 years old and over 65. These groups of the population demand speciﬁc services
that are provided by local authorities, such as elementary education and facilities
for the elderly.
All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the population density and the per-
centage of dependent population, so the results can be interpreted as elasticities.
The data set contains annual data on all Portuguese mainland municipalities, for the years
1986 to 2006. Given that three municipalities12 were only created in 1998, from 1986 to
1998 there are only data for 275 municipalities. Data on municipalities’ local accounts
were obtained from the DGAL’s annual publication Municipal Finances (Direccao Gera
das Autarquias Locais, 1986-2000). That on population and consumer price indexes was
collected from Marktest’s Sales Index (Marktest, 2009) and the proportions of population
under 15 and over 65 were collected from the Regional Statistical Yearbook, of the Por-
tuguese Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, 1986-2006). Descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 3.1. Portuguese municipalities have an average of 540.28
euros per capita for total expenditures in the period in analysis, with a standard devia-
tion of 317.4. Current expenditures account for around 51% of total expenditures, with
capital expenditures representing the other 49%. Of the latter, about 81% are investment
expenditures.
12Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
No Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max
Total Expenditures 5791 540.28 317.40 72.05 2315.13
Current Expenditures 5791 277.76 170.40 41.45 1471.92
Capital Expenditures 5791 262.50 179.20 13.48 1620.73
Investment Expenditures 5791 213.71 156.37 10.08 1359.76
Acquisition of land 3460 7.57 12.62 0.0007 233.23
Housing 3009 15.67 31.29 0.0002 394.90
Transportation material 3998 6.41 7.78 0.008 88.99
Machinery and equipment 4359 11.86 11.48 0.009 146.35
Miscellaneous constructions 4398 127.85 113.04 0.07 1810.72
Overpasses, streets, complementary works 4230 31.11 38.01 0.0004 479.11
Sewage 3761 16.50 23.98 0.002 393.37
Water treatment and distribution 3726 19.63 29.42 0.001 570.88
Rural roads 3783 43.88 57.64 0.003 772.90
Infrastructures and solid waste treatment 1074 5.09 23.44 0.0001 561.10
Other Miscellaneous Constructions 4061 25.70 44.23 0.003 705.72
Other buildings 4393 34.02 38.61 0.02 531.77
Sports, recreational and schooling facilities 3951 14.55 24.64 0.001 361.29
Social equipment Expenditures 1597 6.27 13.28 0.0003 237.66
Other Expenditures in Other Buildings 4319 18.94 28.06 0.001 349.35
Other investments 2063 6.60 13.33 0.0003 191.87
Total Grants 5791 356.42 255.85 46.68 1988.24
Capital Grants 5790 187.91 141.14 18.02 1374.26
Current Grants 5791 168.54 124.34 27.53 979.14
Population (number of inhabitants) 5799 34827 57972 1767 727500
Population Density (inhabitants per km) 5799 2.91 8.68 0.06 86.76
Share of Dependent Population (%) 5799 35.88 4.14 17.10 58.19
Sources: INE, DGAL, SI (several years).
Monetary values are expressed in real and per capita terms. The sample period goes from 1986 to 2006,
except for investment expenditures subcomponents, for which the period has been restricted to 2001.
3.5 Results for geographical distance matrices
Empirical results based on geographical proximity are presented in Tables 3.2 to 3.4. Our
key estimates are discussed in Section 3.5.1, Table 3.2, where we estimate equation (3.6)
for Total, Capital, Current, and Investment Expenditures, using W T as the weighting
matrix. In Section 3.5.2, we test for alternative distance weighting matrices, estimating
equation (3.6) for Total expenditures. Finally, under Section 3.5.3, we extend our empiri-
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cal analysis to investment components. Throughout the analysis we implement a similar
GMM-Sys strategy, which facilitates the comparison of results obtained for diﬀerent de-
pendent variables and weighting matrices.
3.5.1 Total, Capital, Current, and Investment Expenditures
Table 3.2 presents estimation results for total, capital, current and investment real per
capita expenditures. For total expenditures, we estimate equation (3.6) by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS), Fixed Eﬀects (FE) and System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-
Sys) in columns (1) to (6). For the remaining dependent variables, we only estimate the
model by GMM-Sys. In order to take into account for the speciﬁc dynamics of each depen-
dent variable, we include several lags as explanatory variables. The speciﬁc number of lags
of the dependent variable in each equation is reported in the note to Table 3.2. Only the
coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst lag is reported. In all speciﬁcations we estimate equation (3.6) with
and without neighboring expenditures. The spatial dependence variable was computed
using the matrix W T , which considers all Portuguese municipalities as neighbors, with
weights in inverse proportion to the distances between them. For the GMM-Sys we use
the two-step estimation with the ﬁnite-sample correction for standard errors suggested by
Windmeijer (2005). For all speciﬁcations we include time speciﬁc dummies. The reported
statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the errors. Since we
suspect the errors are non-spherical, we report the Hansen consistent test instead of the
Sargan statistic. For the GMM regressions discussed below, we instrument, for the diﬀer-
enced equations, ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the dependent variable using its levels lagged at least
two periods, and its lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences as instruments for the level equations. Grants
and neighboring municipalities expenditures are assumed to be endogenous, and are in-
strumented similarly to lagged own expenditures. The argument is that transfers from
the central government can be, to some extent, inﬂuenced by local governments. Finally,
the demographic variables, as well as the time dummies, are assumed as exogenous. We
based this belief on the fact that municipalities have little or no control over demographic
variables (such as population density and the percentage of people under 15 and over 65).
Furthermore, any shocks that may aﬀect the entire country, which are controlled for by
time dummies, are also exogenous to individual municipalities. Our ﬁrst result (OLS,
columns (1) and (2), Table 3.2) indicates that total expenditures show some degree of
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persistence. Focusing on our key explanatory variable, neighboring total expenditures, we
conclude that there are positive spillover eﬀects across municipalities. When accounting
for unobserved municipality speciﬁc eﬀects, in columns (3) and (4), we corroborate the
results obtained by OLS. Although OLS and FE produce biased estimates, due to the
presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right hand-side of equation (3.6), they
provide a useful benchmark on what we should expect from the consistent GMM estimates.
The serial correlation pattern in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals in models (5) and (6),
by showing insigniﬁcant AR(29 (and AR(3)), indicates that we need to instrument the
equations in ﬁrst-diﬀerences with two lags of the dependent variable, and ﬁrst-diﬀerences
lagged one period for the equations in levels. Additionally, we restrict the instruments for
ﬁrst-diﬀerences equations to ﬁve lags. In order to limit the number of instruments, we do
not apply each moment condition underlying the system-GMM procedure to each time
period and lag available. Instead, we apply a single moment condition for each period
and regressor.13 By estimating our model using the GMM system procedure we conﬁrm
that total expenditures exhibit some persistence, revealed by the estimated coeﬃcient of
0.41 for lag total expenditures, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level - column
(6). This might result from the fact that municipalities’ spending decisions are highly
dependent on their resources and on their population needs, which are also persistent over
time. The exclusion of neighboring total expenditures, column (5), does not signiﬁcantly
alter the level of persistency in the series. Focusing on column (6), we conclude that the
elasticity of own expenditures with respect to neighboring total expenditures is signiﬁcant
and about 0.48: a one percent increase in neighbors’ expenditures is associated with an
increase in own expenditures of about 0.48%, conﬁrming the existence of complementary
characteristics of local public goods provided by neighboring municipalities or mimicking
eﬀects. This result clearly indicates that total expenditures spill over municipalities; i.e.,
own expenditures vary positively with neighbors’ decisions regarding this variable. There
is strong evidence in favor of expenditure interactions among Portuguese municipalities -
the variable WGit is statistically signiﬁcant and positively signed. Grants are statistically
signiﬁcant with a large positive coeﬃcient, derived from the fact that transfers from the
central government are municipalities’ main source of revenue. The density of the popula-
tion exerts a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on total expenditures, suggesting
13The model has been estimated with Stata’s command XTABOND2, and the option ’collapse’ has been
used to deﬁne the instruments for Git−1, grantit and taxesit.
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the existence of congestion eﬀects in the provision of local public goods and services. Con-
trary to our priors, the share of dependent population does not seem to inﬂuence total
expenditures. Given the persistency of the series, and the inclusion of several lags of the
dependent variables as explanatory variables,14 it is not surprising that the demographic
variables, which are quite stable over time, do not exert a large impact. The tests for
serial correlation in the error term reveal, as expected, negative serial correlation in ﬁrst-
diﬀerences, which disappears for second and higher orders. This result follows from the
formulation of equation (3.6), and constitutes a ﬁrst validation of the instruments used.
The Hansen test’s statistic is 10.13, has 9 degrees of freedom, and an associated p-value
of 0.34. This result validates the instrument set used in the estimation of column (6). A
similar conclusion is valid for the estimates presented in column (5). Moving to capital
expenditures, Table 3.2, columns (7) and (8), the estimated coeﬃcient for the lagged de-
pendent variable is slightly smaller than the one estimated for total expenditures. Previous
results extend to capital expenditures; i.e., capital expenditures are positively determined
by grants. The information conveyed by the serial correlation tests, AR(1) to AR(3),
together with the Hansen test, validate de instruments used in our regressions. For both
estimations, columns (7) and (8), the p-value of the Hansen test is bounded between 0.18
and 0.40, and the serial correlation in ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals disappears after two lags.
The estimated coeﬃcient associated with capital expenditures of neighboring municipal-
ities is statistically signiﬁcant, and has increased considerably, indicating an elasticity of
0.69. Grants continue to exert a positive and statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on capital
expenditures. Moving to current expenditures, column (10) reveals a diﬀerent pattern in
terms of residual serial correlation. As we can see in the AR tests, residual’s serial corre-
lation only disappears after 3 lags. This implies that in the instrument set we use current
expenditures lagged three to ﬁve periods for ﬁrst-diﬀerences equations, and ﬁrst-diﬀerences
of current expenditures lagged two periods for equations in levels. The remaining variables
are instrumented as discussed above. Focusing our attention on column (10), the model
with neighboring current expenditures, we now observe that there are spillovers of this
item across municipalities: a 10% increase in neighbors’ expenditures brings about a 5.7%
increase in own current expenditures. Persistence is now much higher, when compared to
the previous expenditure variables. This is consistent with the economic theory, since local
14The choice of the number of lags to include was based on the speciﬁc dynamics of the dependent
variable, as well as on their statistical signiﬁcance.
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governments may not be able to make sudden changes in their ﬁscal choices, either because
they have too high adjustment costs or because they are blocked by law, namely regarding
the wage policy and ﬁring decisions.15 This is particularly true for current expenditures,
which are usually set in advance for several years and are not easily changeable. Fur-
thermore, grants and the demographic variables, although correctly signed, seem to have
a smaller impact when compared to the previous two items. Overall, estimations under
columns (9) and (10) are validated by the serial correlation and Hansen tests.16 Finally,
investment expenditures, which represent the bulk of capital expenditures (around 80%),
reveal signiﬁcant and large overall investment spillovers from neighboring expenditures,
with an elasticity of 0.86. There is also evidence that investment decisions depend on
resources available. As before, the instrument set is validated. Given the relevance of this
sort of expenditures we will discuss the spillovers for diﬀerent investment components in
Section 3.5.3.
3.5.2 Alternative weighting matrices
In order to test the robustness of the results regarding the use of the weighting matrix,
we will now implement our analysis using three alternative weighting matrices described
in section 3.4.1: binary/contiguity (W 0), 50kms (W 50), and 100kms (W 100). The results
are shown in Table 3.3. Columns (1) to (3) present distance decay results considering the
contiguity matrix, while columns (4) and (5) consider 50km and 100km, respectively, as the
maximum distance after which weights are set to zero. The standardized binary/contiguity
matrix (W 0) assigns the value 1 to municipalities that share a border and 0 otherwise.
Throughout this section we only consider total expenditures as our dependent variable.
Not accounting for speciﬁc eﬀects - Table 3.3, column (1) - the elasticity of own ex-
penditures to neighboring total expenditures is quite small (0.09). However, this result is
biased, as we ignore both the ﬁxed unobserved eﬀects and the lagged dependent variable.
The inclusion of municipalities’ ﬁxed eﬀects (column 2) increases the degree to which lo-
cal governments react to their neighbors expenditure decisions. However, this result is
still biased, as the within transformed lagged dependent variable is correlated with the
within transformed error term. In order to solve the bias, and to render our results more
15Expenditures with employees represent around 50% of current expenditures
16We do not restrict the number of instruments when deﬁning the set of instruments for neighboring
Current Expenditures, column (10), which explains the high number of instruments used in this regression.
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Table 3.3: Estimation results for diﬀerent weighting matrices
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5
Weighting Matrix Binary: W 0 W 50 W 100
Model OLS FE GMM-Sys GMM-Sys GMM-Sys
Git−1 0.66*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.35***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
WGjt 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.22** 0.33*** 0.41***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.11) (0.15)
grantit 0.24*** 0.39*** 0.13** 0.10* 0.13**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
dependit -0.007*** 0.002 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
denspopit 0.004** -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 5,508 5,508 5,508 5,508 5,508
R2 0.93 0.90
Municipalities 278 278 278 278
AR(1) -12.04 -12.05 -12.17
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 1.09 0.91 0.96
p-value 0.27 0.36 0.34
Hansen test 3.76 3.56 3.09
p-value 0.59 0.61 0.69
DF 5 5 5
Sources: INE, DGAL, SI (several years).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***1%,
**5% and *10%. GMM-Sys estimations present two-step results. AR(1) and AR(2) refer to ﬁrst and
second order autocorrelation tests. DF stands for degrees of freedom. In each model the dependent
variable is Total Expenditures.
comparable to those presented in the previous section, we implement the system GMM-
Sys estimation17 (column 3) and the results clearly indicate the presence of neighboring
spillover eﬀects. Analyzing the results shown in columns (4) and (5), both estimated
by GMM-Sys, not only do we reinforce the conclusion that there are spillovers of total
expenditures between neighbors, but also that their size is determined by the weighting
17Hansen tests indicate that, for our data, the system-GMM is preferable to the GMM that only includes
the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equations.
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matrix we use. It is clear from our results that, when allowing for a broader deﬁnition of
neighborhood, we capture a higher eﬀect of neighbors’ expenditures. Under the deﬁnition
of 100km neighborhood, we estimate an elasticity of 0.41 (Table 3.3, column 5), while
considering 50km neighborhood (Table 3.3, column 4), we estimate such elasticity to be
of about 0.33. This is understandable, given that the latter deﬁnition of neighborhood is
more restrictive. The remaining results are similar for all regressions. This set of results
corroborates and strengthens the discussion and the options made in Section 3.5.1. As
such, we conclude that there is strategic interaction regarding Portuguese municipalities’
total expenditure levels.
3.5.3 Components of Investment Expenditures
There is no reason to assume that patterns of expenditure interdependence are the same
for all categories of investment. It is possible that some types of spending exert comple-
mentarity and others substitutability, canceling each other out and reducing the aggre-
gate eﬀect. An analysis of aggregate spending levels might bias downward the eﬀects of
spillovers on spending. To investigate this possibility, the model deﬁned in equation (3.6),
and discussed in Section 3.5.1, is now implemented for the sub-components of investment
expenditures.
Until 2001, investment expenditures had seven main categories: (1) Acquisition of
Land, (2) Housing, (3) Transportation Material, (4) Machinery and Equipment; (5) Mis-
cellaneous Constructions; (6) Other Buildings, and (7) Other Investments. Miscellaneous
Constructions and Other Buildings were de-composed in, respectively, six and three sub-
components. When analyzing the data set we realized that some of these items have a
signiﬁcant number of zeros and missing values, which led us to exclude some of them from
the analysis.18 Table 3.4 shows the results for 11 of the 16 components and subcompo-
nents of investment expenditures. In this table, we only report the estimated coeﬃcient
forWGit and its standard error. Additionally, for the GMM type regressions we report the
statistic for the Hansen test, and its degrees of freedom.19 We report estimation results
obtained when using the matrix WT, that is, the matrix that considers all municipalities
18Acquisition of land, Housing, Infrastructures on solid waste treatment, Social equipment, and Other
investments were excluded because they all have an average of more than 50 missing values or zeros per
year.
19Results for the entire regressions are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3.4: Estimation results for some investment components
OLS FE GMM-Sys
D. Variable Coeﬀ. Htest
1. Acquisition of land n.a n.a. n.a n.a
2. Housing
n.a n.a. n.a n.a
3. Transportation material
0.62 0.09 0.40 23.09
(0.10)*** (0.23) (1.78) [17]
4. Machinery and equipment
0.60 0.09 0.94 112.68
(0.08)*** (0.22) (0.15)*** [97]
5. Miscellaneous constructions
0.13 0.51 0.94 26.97*
(0.10) (0.17)*** (0.46)** [18]
5.1. Overpasses, streets and complementary works
0.43 0.26 0.28 37.55
(0.13)*** (0.21) (0.77) [35]
5.2. Sewage
0.28 0.26 0.86 73.61*
(0.11)** (0.22) (0.29)*** [58]
5.3. Water treatment and distribution
0.04 0.10 0.71 10.13
(0.12) (0.17) (0.50) [7]
5.4. Rural roads
0.60 0.51 0.89 41.94
(0.60)*** (0.23)** (0.30)*** [40]
5.5. Infrastructures on solid waste treatment
n.a n.a. n.a n.a
5.6. Other Miscellaneous Constructions
0.25 0.24 0.60 18.25*
(0.12)** (0.21) (0.26)** [11]
6. Other buildings
0.02 0.34 0.15 28.67*
(0.18) (0.23) (0.35) [19]
6.1. Sports, recreational and schooling facilities
0.47 0.55 0.78 45.86*
(0.13)*** (0.14)*** (0.29)*** [33]
6.2. Social equipment
n.a n.a. n.a n.a
6.3. Other Expenditures in Other Buildings
0.59 0.88 0.86 36.04
(0.17)*** (0.21)*** (0.32)*** [28]
7. Other investments n.a n.a. n.a n.a
Sources: INE, DGAL, SI (several years).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Hansen test’s (H-test) degrees of freedom in brackets. Signiﬁcance
level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***1%, **5% and *10%. GMM-Sys estimations present
two-step results. In each model the dependent variable corresponds to D. Variable. The reported
coeﬃcient and standard error is for the neighboring variable. Estimations include third order lags of the
dependent variable; the exception is the estimation for Sports, recreational and schooling facilities, which
includes two lags of the dependent variable.
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as neighbors. The instrument set associated within each GMM regression is similar to the
one discussed in Section 5.1 for investment expenditures. In order to keep the regressions
as comparable as possible, we use the same structure to deﬁne the instruments, partic-
ularly in what concerns exogeneity/endogeneity, and the lags used for the instruments
are the minimum required to validate the estimates. For each investment component we
report the OLS, FE, and GMM-Sys estimates.
When using the system-GMM procedure, there is evidence of positive spillovers across
the border for Machinery and equipment, Miscellaneous Constructions (particularly for
Sewage, Rural Roads, and Other miscellaneous constructions), and for two items of Other
Buildings (Sports, recreational and schooling facilities and Other expenditures). As be-
fore, the instrument set is validated by the serial correlation and overidentiﬁcation tests.
The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the spatial interaction variable associated with Rural roads
may be due to coordination among neighboring municipalities. Roads frequently cross
the borders of several jurisdictions, implying that improvements or extensions in one ju-
risdiction may require complementary investments from neighboring municipalities. The
same reasoning applies to sewage networks. Regarding other items, such as investments
in sports, recreational and schooling facilities, the positive strategic interaction is likely
to be due to mimicking of nearby municipalities, since some expenditures may be used
to attract households and ﬁrms, in line with the tax and welfare competition literature.
Mimicking might also occur for political reasons, if it occurs more in election years or
between mayors of similar political orientation, or due to similarities in the population’s
needs, if it occurs more between jurisdictions that are similar in demographic terms.
3.6 Additional sources of ﬁscal interactions
In order to disentangle the sources of ﬁscal interactions among jurisdictions, we perform
several additional empirical tests. We start by interacting the variable measuring the
weighted average of neighboring municipalities’ expenditures with a series of dummy vari-
ables for electoral years or which characterize municipalities. Second, we test alternative
weighting matrices based on population density and mayors’ ideology. According to the
yardstick competition hypothesis, local jurisdictions react more to their neighbors’ ﬁscal
policies during electoral periods because voters compare the mayors’ performances. To
test this prediction, a dummy variable was created (MunElectionit) for municipal elec-
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tion years. The dummy was then interacted with the variable representing the weighted
average of neighboring municipalities’ expenditures (WGit). We ﬁnd no evidence of yard-
stick competition in the main expenditure items. Table 3.5 presents the results for Total,
Capital, Current and Investment Expenditure. All regressions include the same set of
control variables as those of the previous tables but, in order to economize space, only the
estimated coeﬃcients associated with Git−1, WGit, and its interactions with the electoral
dummy are presented. We cannot include the dummy for municipal elections in the re-
gression because we control for time eﬀects with year dummies, and the former would be
a linear combination of latter dummies. We also run the regressions using investment sub-
components as dependent variables, but results are not consistent with larger interactions
during electoral years.
Table 3.5: Estimation results for yardstick competition models: Estimates using W all
-1 -2 -3 -4
D. Variable TotExp CapExp CurExp InvExp
Model GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys
Git−1 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.65*** 0.52***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
WGit 0.60*** 0.45* 0.28* 0.85**
(0.17) (0.28) (0.16) (0.32)
MunElectionit*WGit 0.02 0.20 -0.07 -0.14
(0.08) (0.17) (0.12) (0.16)
Hansen 36.09 1.16 6.22 33.21
p-value 0.07* 0.14 0.40 0.16
DF 25 11 6 26
Sources: INE, DGAL, SI (several years).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***1%,
**5% and *10%. GMM stands for Generalized Method of Moments system estimation; two-step
estimation results are presented. AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) refer to ﬁrst, second and third order
autocorrelation tests. DF stands for degrees of freedom. In each model the dependent variable
corresponds to D.Variable. Estimations for total, capital, current and investment expenditures include
respectively fourth, second, third and third order lags of the dependent variable.
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In order to investigate other sources of political inﬂuences, we also test if interactions
depend on whether the mayor belongs or not to the Prime-Minister’s party, on her right or
left-wing orientation, on whether the mayors’ party has a majority or not in the municipal
assembly and, ﬁnally, whether municipal/legislative elections were a close race or not. To
test the latter eﬀect for municipal election results, two dummy variables were created: one
takes the value of one when the diﬀerence in the vote shares of the mayors’ party and that
of her main opponent was less than ﬁve percentage points in the last election; and another
dummy for larger diﬀerences in vote shares. Empirical results never indicate statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the degree of strategic interaction among municipalities.20 Fol-
lowing Schaltegger and Ku¨ttel (2002), we investigate if municipalities with larger ﬁscal
autonomy, that is, those that depend less on central government transfers, take their ex-
penditure decisions more independently than the others. Empirical results do not conﬁrm
this hypothesis. Because municipalities constituting the capital of a district could play a
leading role and have diﬀerent expenditure needs, we include a dummy to signal them and
interact it with WGit. No evidence is found that they react diﬀerently to expenditures of
nearby municipalities. As put by Cheshire and Magrini (2009), there is no a priori basis
for selecting distance weights. So, besides the geographical deﬁnitions of neighborhood
described in the previous sub-section, we use other concepts based on population density
and mayors’ ideology. Municipalities with similar population density may have a greater
tendency to mimic each other’s behavior. To test this hypothesis, weights are deﬁned in
the following way:
wPDij =
1
|denspopit−desnpopjt|∑
j
1
|denspopit−desnpopjt|
with j = i (3.7)
The results presented in Table 3.6 reveal that, of the four expenditure items used
as dependent variables, the variable capturing average expenditure by neighboring ju-
risdictions is only statistically signiﬁcant for investment expenditures.21 The estimated
coeﬃcient (0.33) is smaller than the one reported in column 12 of Table 3.2, but it still
suggests that municipalities react to their neighbors’ expenditures. On what concerns in-
vestment decisions, municipalities seem to imitate those with similar population density.
All regressions include the same set of control variables as those presented in table 3.2
but, in order to economize space, only the estimated coeﬃcients associated with Git−1 and
20These results are not shown in the chapter but are available from the authors upon request.
21This result, however, is not conﬁrmed when using the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation procedure.
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WPDGit are presented.
Table 3.6: Estimation results using weights based on population density
-1 -2 -3 -4
D. Variable TotExp CurrentExp CapExp InvExp
Model GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys
Population Density
Git−1 0.44*** 0.69*** 0.33*** 0.53***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
WPDGit 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.33**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14)
Hansen 11.83 4.18 4.69 24.03
p-value 0.22 0.38 0.46 0.15
DF 9 4 5 18
Sources: INE, DGAL, SI (several years).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***1%,
**5% and *10%. GMM stands for Generalized Method of Moments system estimation; two-step
estimation results are presented. AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) refer to ﬁrst, second and third order
autocorrelation tests. DF stands for degrees of freedom. In each model the dependent variable
corresponds to D.Variable. Estimations for total, current, capital and investment expenditures include,
respectively, fourth, third, second and third order lags of the dependent variable.
We also investigate if political ideology similarity between local governments increases
mimicking in policy resolutions, because of similar preferences and larger sharing of ideas
among politicians. To test this hypothesis, mayors were classiﬁed as right or left-wing
oriented. Two political weighting matrices were deﬁned. One matrix (WSP ) assigns a
weight of 1/sit when municipalities i and j are ruled by mayors with the same political
aﬃliation at time t, and zero otherwise. sit is the total number of municipalities that are
governed by a mayor belonging to the party in oﬃce in municipality i at time t. The
other matrix is 1 − WSP . Both matrices have zero diagonals. We then multiply these
matrices by the inverse distance matrix, and normalize the weights to one. We intended
to include the two series obtained, for the average expenditure of neighbors of the same
political color and for neighbors of diﬀerent political color in the regression and test for
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the equality of estimated coeﬃcients. However, the two series turned out to be highly
correlated and could not be included simultaneously in the same regression. For total
expenditures the correlation is 96.6%. This is not surprising, since Veiga and Veiga (2007)
found that mayors’ ideology does not play a signiﬁcant role in per capita local governments’
expenditure decisions.
3.7 Conclusion
The chapter aims at understanding the driving forces of interactions in Portuguese mu-
nicipalities’ expenditure levels. A dynamic panel data model is estimated based on juris-
dictional reaction functions. The analysis was performed for all 278 Portuguese mainland
municipalities from 1986 to 2006. Given the persistence of the expenditure series, esti-
mations were performed by system-GMM using alternative ways to measure geographical
neighborhood. The empirical results allow us to conclude that local governments do not
make their spending decisions in isolation; they are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the actions
of neighboring municipalities. For total expenditures, there is evidence that a 10% increase
in nearby municipalities’ expenditures increases expenditures in a given municipality by
4.8%, on average. For current and, especially for capital expenditures, the eﬀect is also
visible at the aggregate level. Results also support the existence of strong spillovers for
investment expenditures, and for the sub-components Machinery and Equipment; Sports,
recreational and schooling facilities and expenditures on constructions that require coor-
dination among neighboring municipalities.
In order to disentangle the sources of interaction, we use alternative weighting matrices to
geographic proximity that take into account similarity in population density and political
party similarity of the mayors. Only for investment expenditures does population density
seem to be a driving force of spatial interactions among local governments. Similarity,
politicians’ ideology does not seem to generate copycat eﬀects. We also test for yardstick
competition and for diﬀerences in interactions among municipalities resulting from may-
ors’ political characteristics (belonging to the Prime-Minister’s party, being right-wing
oriented, or having a majority in the municipal assembly), from whether municipalities
are a district capital or not, and whether the last municipal election was a close race or
not. Results allow us to reject these hypotheses. Portuguese municipalities react to each
other’s expenditures due to spillovers that require coordination in expenditure items and
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to mimicking behavior of the others, possibly with the purpose of attracting households
and ﬁrms.
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